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INTRODUCTION

Indian tribes and individual Indians possess an enormous stake in
domestic mineral resources: 55 million surface acres and 57 million acres of
subsurface mineral estates, all of which is held in trust for them by the United
States.' This vast acreage is mineral-rich, and it and the mineral estates
themselves remain largely untapped.2

Director, American Indian Law Program; Associate Clinical Professor; University of
Colorado Law School. I would like to express deep gratitude to my research assistant, Michael
Holditch, as well as thank Kristen Carpenter, Sarah Krakoff, Charles Wilkinson, Monte Mills,
Deborah Cantrell, Brad Bernthal, Helen Norton, Kristelia Garcia, Blake Reid, and Rich
Bienstock for helpful comments; participants in Works-in-Progress at the University of Colorado
Law School and the Federal Bar Association Indian Law Section for advice, ideas, and helpful
discussion; and Tom Fredericks, the Ute Indian Tribe, the Spokane Tribe of Indians, the
Coalition of Large Tribes, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, Rebecca Adamson, and Tex Hall for the opportunity to
experience the complexities of this topic firsthand. Any errors are mine alone.
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The main complicating factor for tribes and individual Indians
considering development of their mineral wealth is the unique status of their
lands, whereby the United States, as trustee, holds Indian lands in trust for the
benefit of Indians. As a result, these "tribal trust lands" are treated as federal
lands and are therefore subject to the complex, onerous, and manifold federal
laws and regulations applicable to federal lands.4
Federal Indian policy generally is a continuum spanning the United
States' control over and obligation to Indians as trustee on the one end and
tribal self-determination on the other. Where tribal autonomy is highest, the
trust relationship retreats, and where the trust is the most robust, tribal selfdetermination becomes constrained.' The three federal statutes that govern
I

Energy Development in Indian Country: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs,
112th Cong. 18 (2012) [hereinafter Energy Development Hearings] (statement of Jodi Gillette,
Deputy Assistant Sec'y of Indian Affairs). This testimony also contains the following statement
on the eye-opening abundance of energy resources on tribal lands: "In consultation with tribes,
the Office of Indian Energy and Economic Development . .. ha[s] assisted Tribes and allottees in
the exploration and development of 2.1 million acres of active and 15 million acres of potential
energy and mineral resources." Id.; see also U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO- 15-502,
INDIAN

ENERGY

DEVELOPMENT:

POOR MANAGEMENT

BY

BIA

HAS

HINDERED

ENERGY

DEVELOPMENT ON INDIAN LANDS 1 (2015) [hereinafter 2015 GAO REPORT].

2

See Shawn E. Regan & Terry L. Anderson, The Energy Wealth of Indian Nations, 3 LA.
ST. U. J. ENERGY L. & RESOURCES 195, 211 (2014) ("In 2008, the DOI estimated that Indian lands
contain over 5 billion barrels of oil, 37 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 53 billion tons of
coal that are technically recoverable with current technologies."); Shawn Regan, Unlocking the
Wealth of Indian Nations: Overcoming Obstacles to Tribal Energy Development, PERC POLICY
PERSPECTIVE, Feb. 2014, at 13-16, http://www.perc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/IndianPolicy
Series%20HIGH.pdf [hereinafter Unlocking the Wealth of Indian Nations]; see also U.S. DEP'T
OF ENERGY, GEOSPATIAL ANALYSIS OF RENEWABLE ENERGY TECHNICAL POTENTIAL ON TRIBAL

LANDS (2013). According to a recent study, these Indian energy resources amount to 30% of this
nation's coal reserves west of the Mississippi, 50% of potential uranium reserves, and 20% of
known oil and gas reserves. MAURA GROGAN, REBECCA MORSE & APRIL YOUPEE-ROLL, NATIVE
AMERICAN LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 7 (2011), http://www.resource

govemance.org/sites/default/files/RWI Native AmericanLands_2011 .pdf.
See Energy Development Hearings, supra note 1, at 20. This testimony contains the
following:
Since 2008 IEED has assisted Indian mineral owners in the negotiation of 48
IMDA leases for oil, gas, renewable energy, and aggregate totaling
approximately 2,750,000 acres and about $45 million in bonuses (upfront
payments). These leases have the potential to produce over $20 billion in
revenue to the Indian mineral owner over the life of the leases through
royalties and working interests.
Id "In the last 25 years, Congress has provided about $83 million in funding to the Department
for projects to assess and help develop energy and mineral resources information on Indian trust
lands." Id at 17; see also 25 U.S.C.

§

177 (2013); FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER:

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND AMERICAN INDIANS 108-14 (1984).

See 2015 GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 15.
See Ezra Rosser, The Trade-Off Between Self-Determination and the Trust Doctrine:
Tribal Government and the PossibilityofFailure, 58 ARK. L. REV. 291 (2005).
4
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Indian energy-the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 ("IMLA"),6 the Indian
Mineral Development Act of 1982 ("IMDA"),7 and § 3504 of the Energy
Policy Act of 2005, or tribal energy resource agreements ("TERAs")illustrate the unworkability of this tension.9
The challenge to develop Indian energy begs consideration of the role
that exercise of congressional plenary power in instituting federal Indian policy
can and should play in the development of resources on tribal land moving
forward, especially in light of international consensus concerning indigenous
rights. This Article suggests an addition to the trust-sovereignty continuum in
tribal energy policy, whereby Congress would acknowledge the right of tribes
and individual Indians to free, prior and informed consent over impacts to their
lands, territories, or resources.
This Article is divided into several sections, meant to examine Indian
policy and jurisprudence as currently applied to tribal energy policy. First, the
plenary power doctrine is explained and set against the premise of the federalIndian trust relationship; the current statutory regime is then contextualized in
the eras of allotment, termination, and self-determination and set against
relevant judicial decisions. Second, alternatives to congressional plenary
authority and federal trust oversight are explored, both in the context of tribal
sovereign action and within the human rights framework. Finally, recent
congressional action on the Keystone XL pipeline is considered as possible
insight into the irreconcilable tension between plenary authority of a political
body and tribal consent in developing energy policy.
II. FEDERAL INDIAN ENERGY POLICY ACT 1: THE ALLOTMENT AND
REORGANIZATION POLICY AND THE INDIAN MINERAL LEASING ACT

The exercise of congressional plenary power as to Indian mineral
resources is directly tied to statutes on land policy generally.' 0 In 1887, just six

8

Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g (2013).
Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1208.
Energy Policy Act of 2005, 25 U.S.C. § 3504.

9

See Judith V. Royster, PracticalSovereignty, PoliticalSovereignty, and the Indian Tribal

6

Energy Development and Self-Determination Act, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1065, 1100-01
(2008) ("Unlike the Indian Mineral Leasing Act, which encouraged tribal dependence on
government decision-making, the modem statutes set forth a clear bargain. Tribes can take
advantage of new options and increased practical sovereignty, but in exchange the government
has a deeply discounted trust responsibility.").
10
See D.S. OTIs, THE DAwEs ACT AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS 5-6 (Francis Paul
Prucha ed., U. of Okla. Press 1973); see also Peter F. Carroll, Note, Drumming out the Intent of
the Indian MineralLeasing Act of 1938, 7 PuB. LAND L. REv. 135, 136 (1986) ("In 1891, [The
General Allotment Act of 1887] was amended to allow, for the first time, mineral leasing of
Indian lands. The 1891 Act provided that the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) could issue
mineral leases on unallotted Indian lands 'not needed for farming or agricultural purposes, and
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years after the end of treaty-making, Congress unilaterally divided and
allocated tribally owned lands among individual tribal members, with the
passage of the General Allotment Act, or the Dawes Act." The codification of
the allotment policy as law "initiated an era in which national policy sought to
assimilate the Indian into a Western European lifestyle." 2
Allotment was a wholesale change to federal Indian policy that affected
every aspect of how tribal lands were handled, including mineral exploration
and development.' 3 Under the Act, lands "granted" to individual Indian
allottees did not feature fee simple ownership, rather, the United States retained
legal title to the land as trustee for the individual allottee. Therefore, an Indian
landowner possessed only significantly encumbered "usufruct" or beneficial
title whereby sale or lease was subject to the federal government's approval.14
In 1891, Congress passed further legislation to address the issue of
lease approvals on allotted Indian lands. The Act of February 28, 1891
provided, in relevant part,
That whenever it shall be made to appear to the Secretary of
the Interior that, by reason of age or other disability, any
allottee under the provisions of said act, or any other act or
treaty can not personally and with benefit to himself occupy or
improve his allotment or any part thereof the same may be
leased upon such terms, regulations and conditions as shall be
prescribed by such Secretary, for a term not exceeding three
years for farming or grazing, or ten years for mining
purposes.

'5

Consistent with the trust-beneficiary relationship set forth in the Dawes Act, the
1891 Act specifically limited leases to those approved by the Secretary of the
Interior.
Thirty-three years later, Congress passed The Act of May 29, 1924,
allowing for extension of leases for mining purposes beyond the ten-year
are not desired for individual allotments. . . ' Although the 1891 Act applied only to Indian lands
that were bought and paid for, it did allow the Secretary to lease unimproved and unused
allotments under certain conditions. The 1891 Act established the Indian mineral leasing program
which was added to or amended several times in the next thirty years." (citations omitted)).
"
Pub. L. No. 49-119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.).
12
See Carroll,supra note 10, at 136.
13
See Judith V. Royster, Mineral Development in Indian Country: The Evolution of Tribal
Control over Mineral Resources, 29 TULSA L. REv. 541, 552-53 (1994) (explaining that prior to
the allotment era, Indians could not alienate minerals from their own lands without congressional
approval). It was during the allotment era that Congress began to enact legislation allowing,
under limited circumstances, allottees to lease their land for mineral development. Id
14
History of Allotment, INDIAN LAND TENURE FOUND., https://www.iltf.org/resources/landtenure-history/allotment (last visited Nov. 5, 2015); see OTis, supra note 10, at 6.
15
Act of Feb. 28, 1891, § 3, 26 Stat. 794.
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restriction in the 1891 Act. The 1924 Act also provided that "production of oil
and gas and other minerals on such lands may be taxed by the State in which
said lands are located in all respects the same as production on unrestricted
lands."' 6 Coinciding with states imposing taxing power over tribal land was the
right of the Secretary of the Interior to "issue mineral leases on unallotted
Indian Lands" pursuant to an 1891 amendment to the General Allotment Act of
1887.17 The same 1924 statute that gave states the right to tax Indian mineral
royalties provided that the Secretary could allow leases to "remain in effect as
long as these leases were productive," which loosened the strict ten-year limit
imposed by the 1891 Act.1 8
In 1934, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §§
461-494a (the "IRA"), or the Wheeler-Howard Act, which effectively ended
allotment.1 9 The IRA also sought to promote tribal self-government and selfdetermination toward restoring the rights of tribes to manage land and assets. 20
The IRA contained mechanisms for tribes to adopt written constitutions,
authorized funds to aid tribal governments, and allowed the Secretary of the
Interior to take land into trust for tribes. 2
On May 11, 1938, Congress passed the Indian Mineral Leasing Act
("IMLA"). IMLA served to resolve a confused and inconsistent Indian mineral
policy in the wake of the IRA and allotment; it lies furthest on the high-federaltrust low-tribal-sovereignty end of the spectrum. The historical context

16
OTIs, supra note 10, at 136-37; see also Kristen A. Carpenter, Contextualizingthe Losses
ofAllotment Though Literature, 82 N.D. L. REV. 605 (2006).
17
OTIS, supra note 10, at 136 (citing Act of Feb. 28, 1891, ch. 383, 26 Stat. 794).
18
Id. The decades leading up to the passage of the IRA established a federal-state scheme of
control over mineral development on Indian lands and the benefits arising therefrom. There thus
existed a dissonance between autonomy granted to Indians over their land in the IRA and the
mineral leasing scheme that was currently in place, an incongruity leading to the passage of
IMLA in 1938. See also Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759 (1985) (holding
that Congress nullified the power of the states to tax Indian mineral leases in enacting IMLA).
19
Joseph D. Matal, A Revisionist History of American Indian Country, 14 ALASKA L. REV.
283, 307 (1997); see also ALEXANDER TALLCHIEF SKIBINE, TOWARDS A TRUST WE CAN TRUST:
TAKING THE DUTY TO TRANSFER LAND INTO TRUST FOR INDIAN TRIBES SERIOUSLY 9 (2010),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1639567 ("One can argue that in enacting the
IRA and re-establishing a government to government relationship with Indian tribes, Congress
also rejected the rather racist version of the trust doctrine prevailing during the allotment era
an[d] re-instated the original or Marshall version of the trust doctrine. Under this version, trust
duties are not obligations that exist because Indians are weak and defenseless, poor, or
incompetent, but arise because Indian tribes ceded millions of acres to the United States, either in
treaties or through the doctrine of discovery, and in exchange, the United States promised that it
would protect the tribes' exclusive right to their territories and the right to exercise tribal selfgovernment inside these territories.").
20

See generally ELMER R. Rusco, A FATEFUL TIME: THE BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY OF THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT (Jerome E. Edwards ed., 2000).
21

Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (2013).
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surrounding IMLA is significant in framing and understanding the progression
of trust and sovereignty regarding tribal energy policy. On a pragmatic level,
certain factors were present during the passage of IMLA that may have
contributed to the character of the statute. In fact, the Secretary himself initiated
adjustments to the Indian mineral leasing program after the enactment of the
IRA, which might help explain why the Secretary retained so much deference
and oversight over mineral leasing in IMLA while the states lost their power to
tax Indian mineral royalties.2 2 In addition, IMLA functioned as the Indian
energy leasing regulatory scheme necessary in the wake of increased tribal
sovereignty recognized by the Indian Reorganization Act.
IMLA specifies that "unallotted lands within any Indian reservation or
lands owned by any tribe, group, or band of Indians under Federal
jurisdiction . . . may, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, be
leased for mining purposes." 2 3 Alongside IMLA's requirement that tribal
mineral leases be approved by the Secretary of the Interior, a number of
limitations on the leasing power of tribes and individual Indians are enumerated
in the statute. 24 For example, specific parameters are placed on Indian lease
terms, such as the provision in § 396a stating that leasing terms cannot "exceed
ten years and as long thereafter as minerals are produced in paying
quantities." 25 Additionally, under IMLA, the Secretary of the Interior enjoys
wide discretion as to whether the lease is appropriate and in the "best interest"
of the Indians, extending into multiple aspects of the leasing process.26 To wit,
§ 396b provides the Secretary may reject a leasing bid, even if that is the
highest bid submitted, if the Secretary determines that accepting the bid will
not be in the tribe's best interest.27 Ultimately, IMLA provides the Secretary of
the Interior with virtually unbridled discretion over the processes involved in
establishing Indian mineral leasing agreements.28 However, this discretion is
subject to the fiduciary obligation of the United States as trustee.29
See Carroll, supra note 10, at 137 (citing H.R. REP. No. 75-1872, at 1 (1938)); see also id.
at 138-44 (summarizing the holding and implications thereof in Montana, 471 U.S. 759 (1985),
in which the Court based its ruling that the silence on taxation in IMLA did not imply a
continuation of the taxing power the states possessed pursuant to the 1924 Act, and a lack of
express provisions allowing state taxation stood as a preclusion of state taxing power).
23
Indian Mineral Leasing Act, 25 U.S.C. § 396a.
24
Id
22

25

Id.

Id. §§ 396b-396d.
Id. § 396b.
28
See id. § 396d ("All operations under any oil, gas, or other mineral lease issued pursuant to
the terms of sections 396a to 396g of this title or any other Act affecting restricted Indian lands
shall be subject to the rules and regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior. In the
discretion of the said Secretary, any lease for oil or gas issued under the provisions of sections
396a to 396g of this title shall be made subject to the terms of any reasonable cooperative unit or
other plan approved or prescribed by said Secretary prior or subsequent to the issuance of any
26
27
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If the IRA were the catalyst for IMLA, the implications for the
government as trustee are necessarily complicated; IMLA reflects the IRA
period's intentions for tribal self-determination but also its paternalistic
structure and means. The IRA sought to give tribal governments the ability to
organize themselves and manage their own affairs. IMLA settled the question
of whether a state could tax mineral proceeds-it could not-but the federalIndian relationship in Indian mineral leases remained inextricably intertwined
and tribes still lacked full decision-making power over their lands and
resources. 3 0
The Supreme Court was also active during this period in its
jurisprudence on the federal trust responsibility and Indian lands. The year of
IMLA's passage also garnered the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Shoshone Tribe of Indians of the Wind River Reservation in Wyoming, 3 1
holding that mineral rights on a reservation belonged not to the federal
government, but to the tribe.3 2 A few years after the passage of IMLA, the
Supreme Court further endorsed a federal "trust" predicated on Indian
dependence and land status in Seminole Nation v. United States3 3 affirming
that the United States "has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest
34
responsibility and trust" in carrying out treaty obligations. By invoking a
such lease which involves the development or production of oil or gas from land covered by such
lease."). This section exemplifies the extensive and multi-leveled reach of Secretarial discretion
under IMLA.
29
But see United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 506-09 (2003). Though
acknowledging the existence of a general trust relationship, the Court denies that IMLA or its
regulations established a fiduciary relationship that supported a claim for monetary damages:
"[T]he IMLA and its regulations do not assign to the Secretary managerial control over coal
leasing. Nor do they even establish the 'limited trust relationship,' existing under the GAA; no
provision of the IMLA or its regulations contains any trust language with respect to coal leasing."
Id. (citations omitted).
30
See Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 765-66 (1985) (using the Indian
canons of construction, as well as the text and legislative history of IMLA, to determine that the
Act did not give Montana consent to tax tribal royalty income); see also Sam Deloria, New
Paradigm:Indian Tribes in the Land of UnintendedConsequences, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 301,
308 (2006) (explaining that federal protection of tribes from state imposition is necessary for
tribes to retain a meaningful degree of sovereignty). This illuminates a complicating federaltribal dynamic in the context of this Article about the inverse relationship between federal trust
and tribal sovereignty.
31
304 U.S. 111 (1938).
32
Idatll8.
3

316 U.S. 286 (1942).
Id. at 296 (emphases added). Also of note in this part of the opinion is the description of
the federal trust responsibility toward the tribes as a "humane and self imposed policy,"
reflecting a common law fiduciary role similar to that described in Moose v. United States, 674
F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1982). Seminole Nation, 316 U.S. at 296. Moose explains that courts have
found a trust to be created where a property owner declares that he or she is holding the property
for another's benefit. Moose, 674 F.2d at 1281 n.7.
34

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2015

7

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 118, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 8

796

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118

moral obligation to Indians and describing the United States as "more than a
mere contracting party" in executing its obligations to the tribes, the Supreme
Court further elucidated the duties owed to Indian tribes and peoples in the
treaty context as characterized by a trust relationship between the United States
and Indian tribes transcendent of common law trust doctrine. 3 5 However, with a
lack of precedent or common law boundaries to the trust relationship, a
flexibility to the meaning of "trust" could emerge that would expose tribes to
the possibility of exploitation by their federal trustee. Therefore, no firm,
reliable, or enforceable mechanism has been developed to govern the
relationship between the United States and Indian tribes.
This jurisprudential and political gap came to full expression in the
following decade, when the United States Congress unilaterally abandoned the
trappings of the trust relationship. On August 1, 1953, the House of
Representatives announced their support for a new policy in House Concurrent
Resolution 108 ("HCR-108"), whereby federal "supervision"-i.e., trust
responsibility--over American Indian tribes would be abolished as soon as
possible, and all Indians would become subject to the same laws, privileges,
and responsibilities as other U.S. citizens.3 6 In the ensuing years, well into the
mid-1960s, Congress passed what became known as "termination" acts on a
tribe-by-tribe basis.37 The effect of the termination acts was to end federal
recognition status for 109 tribes and bands as "domestic dependent nations";
"[a]pproximately 2,500,000 acres of trust land was removed from protected
status" during these years, much of which became alienated to non-Indians.38
For terminated tribes, the trust responsibility ended, as did federal recognition
of their sovereignty.3 9

3

Seminole Nation, 316 U.S. at 296; see also Moose, 674 F.2d at 1281. In reference to the

rule that there need be no specific "trust" language in the creation of the trust so long as the
property owner declares the property is being held for the benefit of another, the Moose court
states that "this general rule applies with perhaps greater than usual force to a situation where the
United States holds funds for an Indian tribe because of the traditional and repeated emphasis on
the fiduciary nature of the United States-Indian relationship." Id This helps explain how the
court placed the Indian trust relationship within a common law trust context and from there
described the particularly extensive degree to which trust duties apply in federal dealings with
tribes.
36
H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong. (1953).
See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 564a-564x (2013) (termination of federal supervision of the
3
Klamath Tribe).
History and Culture Termination Policy-1953-1968, AM. INDIAN RELIEF COUNCIL,
http://www.nrcprograms.org/site/PageServer?pagename=airc hist-terminationpolicy (last visited
Nov. 5, 2015).
39
See Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric R. Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM.
INDIAN L. REv. 139, 142 (1977); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Statement Before the Senate Committee
on Indian Affairs: Oversight Hearing on Fulfillingthe FederalTrust Responsibility (Mich. State
Univ. Legal Studies Research, Paper No. 10-13, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract-2060395. See

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol118/iss2/8

8

Fredericks: Penary Energy
PLENARYENERGY

2015]

797

III. FEDERAL INDIAN ENERGY POLICY ACT 2: SELF-DETERMINATION BUT
CONTINUED TRUST

The tide changed again in 1970, when Richard Nixon ended
termination in a "Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs." Nixon's
message articulated the essence of the current self-determination policy and
stated that the national policy toward Indian affairs was to promote selfdetermination of tribes without termination of the federal trust relationship.40
Critically, Nixon's restoration of the federal trust relationship also featured a
new recognition of a coexisting tribal self-determination:

'

Federal termination errs in one direction, Federal
paternalism errs in the other. Only by clearly rejecting both of
these extremes can we achieve a policy which truly serves the
best interests of the Indian people. Self-determination among
the Indian people can and must be encouraged without the
threat of eventual termination. In my view, in fact, that is the
only way that self-determination can effectively be fostered.
This, then, must be the goal of any new national policy
toward the Indian people: to strengthen the Indian's sense of
autonomy without threatening his sense of community. We
must assure the Indian that he can assume control of his own
life without being separated involuntarily from the tribal group.
And we must make it clear that Indians can become
independent of Federal control without being cut off from
Federal
concern and Federal support.
My specific
recommendations to the Congress are designed to carry out this
4
policy.
In immediate application, the national policy was statutorily manifest
outside the mineral context in the 1975 Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act ("ISDEAA").4 2 The ISDEAA embodies this dual

generally Michael C. Walsh, Terminating the Indian Termination Policy, 35 STAN. L.

REv. 1181

(1983).
40
Richard Nixon, Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, AM. PRESIDENCY
PROJECT (July 8, 1970), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2573.
41

Id

Comfort with the notion that there exists a meaningful federal trust responsibility in an era
where tribes seek control of federal programs and services may, at first blush, seem
counterintuitive. In Robert McCarthy's The Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Federal Trust
Obligation to American Indians, McCarthy acknowledges difficulties in reconciling selfgovernance with the trust relationship. He cites specifically to the Tribal Government Task Force
of the AIPRC stating that giving tribes control over trust resources implicitly terminates the trust
42
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vision of tribal sovereignty and trust, providing for a willing tribe to contract its
own services back from the federal government, as well as grant the tribe
monies to assist them in building their capacity to achieve the ability to do so.43
The ISDEAA also obliges the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to give requesting tribes control over federal
Indian programs. 4 4 Under Title II of this statute, Congress also created the SelfGovernment program, which strives to empower participating tribes to an even
further extent, increasing tribal control over Bureau of Indian Affairs
programs.4 5
The tribal energy quandary still remained complicated for the United
States, tribal nations, and allottees to resolve. Even after Nixon's 1970
directive, the high-trust, low-sovereignty IMLA continued to prescribe federal
control over Indian mineral leasing arrangements. Frustrated, tribes began to
seek other solutions. In 1975, for example, the Blackfeet Tribe expressed their
sovereign will by entering into a "Petroleum Companies" arrangement with
another tribe.4 6 Following the attempts of the two tribes to circumvent IMLA
requirements, the Solicitor for the Department of the Interior issued an opinion
that IMLA authorized only leasing as a form of agreement.4 7 Thereafter,
attorneys from the Department of the Interior, working with tribal attorneys,
drafted IMDA.4 8

relationship. Robert McCarthy, The Bureau ofIndian Affairs and the FederalTrust Obligation to
American Indians, 19 BYU J. PuB. L. 1, 139 (2004). Notwithstanding the logical complications
of maintaining that there exists a trust relationship in this era of self-determination, one must be
mindful of the fact that the federal government protects the tribes from more than just itself. See
id at 133 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 450). In Sam Deloria's article, New Paradigm:Indian Tribes in the
Land of UnintendedConsequences, Deloria points out that the only feasible way of retaining any
degree of tribal sovereignty beyond that which is "self-referential and abstract" is to uphold
federal recognition of the tribes so that tribal governance continues to be protected from state and
local government by the Supremacy Clause. Deloria, supra note 30, at 308. Seen in this light,
retaining the federal relationship with tribes is vital to sovereignty rather than nullifying of it, and
imposing upon itself specific trust duties simply may not be the most prudent option for Congress
when considering potential judicial hostilities toward the reconcilability of sovereignty and
federal oversight. Id. Of note in the self-governance context is that Deloria emphasized the need
for federal recognition of tribes in order for states to "recognize their governmental character"
and abide by the boundaries of a "juridical space" in which tribes can exercise their powers. Id;
see also U.S. CoNST. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause).
43
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-458ddd2
(2013).
4
Id
45
See Indian Mineral Development: HearingsBefore the Select Comm. on Indian Affairs to
Consider S. 1894, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) [hereinafter IMDA Hearings S. 1894]; S. REP. No.
97-472 (1982).
46
IMDA HearingsS. 1894, supra note 45.
47

Id.

48

Id.
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IMDA's legislative history establishes that tribes and the bill's
proponents understood IMDA was to provide tribes with greater autonomy in
decisions around the development of their mineral resources. In February of
1982, the Senate's Select Committee on Indian Affairs held hearings on the
proposed bill. During these hearings, Senator John Melcher of Montana
articulated the purpose of the bill as "to provide Indian tribes greater flexibility
than they now have for the development and sale of their mineral resources." 4 9
Melcher also stated that the tribes should have "the right to negotiate terms of
contracts like any other owner of valuable resources."so Tribal leaders and
Indian advocates testifying at the hearing also lauded the increased flexibility
the proposed bill provided. Representatives of the Blackfeet Tribe expressed a
general support for the bill on the basis that "realization" of the selfdetermination policy adopted by the federal government required recognition
that Indian tribes are "self-sufficient economic units."5 ' This, in turn, required
the ability of tribes to "make decisions regarding their resources." 52
With more tribal autonomy, but full Secretarial engagement and
approval, IMDA inched to the middle of the trust-sovereignty continuum.
IMDA, like IMLA before it, requires Secretarial approval for Indian mineral
agreements and grants deference to the Secretary in determining whether a
given agreement is in the best interest of the tribe.s3 However, IMDA provides
a wider variety of agreements for tribes to consider entering, including "joint
venture, operating, production sharing, service, managerial, lease or other
agreement[s]."S 4 IMDA also retroactively applied to mineral agreements
entered into between January 1, 1975, and December 22, 1982, that were
approved by the Secretary but did not fall strictly under the category of lease,
allowing for an affirmation of the legitimacy of a tribe's prior mineral
agreements.
Interestingly, discussion in the legislative process surrounding IMDA
on the need for tribal self-determination and sovereignty coexisted alongside
supporters' express belief that the federal trust responsibility and attendant
oversight and approval responsibilities of the Secretary of the Interior present
in IMLA were to remain intact. Throughout the legislative hearings and
committee process, tribal leaders and advocates, as well as industry interests,
voiced concern over the possibility of limiting federal trust oversight in favor of

49
50
51

Id. at 1 (statement of Sen. John Melcher, Acting Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs).
Id. at 3.
Id. at 14 (statement of the Blackfeet Tribe).

52

Id. at

s3

Indian Mineral Development Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2107 (2013).

54

Id. § 2101(a).
Id. § 2104. The coverage of agreements back to 1975 served to legitimize the Blackfeet

5

1-4.

and Jicarilla Apache agreements that instigated the legislation.
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tribal self-determination. John Gidley, Vice President of Fourstar Resources,
stated, "If the Indian people were allowed to negotiate their own lease
agreements without an agency established to interpret and evaluate the pending
contracts, the legal departments of the oil industry would have a field day using
contractual language with dual meanings."56 George Hiwalker, Jr., Vice
President of Northern Cheyenne tribal council, testified to express concern over
the retroactive aspect of IMDA, worrying that the retroactive ratification did
not necessarily entail that type of "particularized analysis" of those agreements
that is required under the U.S. trust responsibility. 5 7 Senator Melcher declared
that the proposed bill "leaves the Secretary to determine, by regulations, the
terms tha[t] an agreement would include and the financial return to the tribe or
individual."5 The Secretary was thus understood to retain a high degree of
oversight over the terms of the mineral agreements, cutting off unfettered tribal
freedom at the level of choosing what types of mineral agreements to pursue.
In August of 1982, responding to the concerns about federal oversight,
the House Committee on Insular Affairs submitted a revision of the proposed
bill that added six specific factors for the Secretary to consider in deciding
whether or not approval of a proposed Indian mineral agreement was in the best
interest of the tribe.59 The factors presented covered a wide range of
considerations, including potential economic returns for the tribe from the
proposed agreement, environmental impacts the agreement would have on
tribal lands, and whether the agreement contains any provisions through which
Indians are able to resolve disputes that may arise on a future date. 60 Required
Secretarial consideration of these factors was incorporated into the final bill,
reflecting the far-reaching extent to which Secretarial oversight remained an
encompassing aspect of mineral development under IMDA. 6 1 Finally, in asking
the Speaker of the House for unanimous consent of the Senate's amendments to
the bill, former Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall framed the intent of the
bill as to provide Indians with greater risk and greater potential reward.62
IMDA passed in October 1982 as a conceptual embodiment of tribal
self-determination fortified by the trust relationship. Although it sought to

56

IMDA HearingsS. 1894, supra note 45, at 137 (statement of John Gidley, Vice President,

Fourstar Resources).
5
Id. at 18 (statement of George Hiwalker, Jr., Vice President, N. Cheyenne Tribal Council).
58
Id. at 3-4.
59
H.R. REP. No. 97-746 (1982).
60

Id

See 25 U.S.C. § 2103 (2013) ("[T]he Secretary shall determine if it is in the best interest of
the Indian tribe or of any individual Indian who may be party to such agreement and shall
consider, among other things, the potential economic return to the tribe; the potential
environmental, social, and cultural effects on the tribe; and provisions for resolving disputes that
may arise between the parties to the agreement ....
62
128 CONG. REc. 30,042 (1982).
61
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provide tribes with greater flexibility to pursue and negotiate various types of
mineral development agreements and retain the federal government's trust
duties to ensure that the mineral agreements are ultimately in the tribe's best
interests, IMDA also expressly limited the actionable remedies for tribes
seeking to enforce those duties.
The case for heavy application of the trust responsibility and oversight
in the approval process arises from the fact that the Secretary, not the tribe, is
ultimately deciding to place legal obligations upon the tribe. However, the
statutory language of IMDA removing liability from the United States for
losses sustained from an approved mineral agreement while expressly declaring
the continuance of the trust responsibility provides little guidance in defining
the duties that the United States retains after approving a proposed agreement.
The legislative history of IMDA reflects an understanding that the
statute was intended to give Indians the opportunity to engage in riskier mineral
development endeavors with minimal protection from uneven bargaining power
with mineral development companies. Stringent federal trust requirements
during the Secretarial approval process would be useful to provide resources
for tribes to mitigate the uneven negotiating power large oil companies may
have over tribes. However, giving binding authority to the United States and
then excusing the United States from liability for losses sustained during the
course of a mineral agreement leaves tribes in danger of having to endure the
terms of agreements rendered unprofitable by circumstances that could not
have been foreseen by the Secretary at the time of approval. Without a remedy,
requiring Secretarial approval for termination of these agreements becomes
more of a bureaucratic obstacle that unduly lengthens the amount of time the
agreement remains intact, in turn increasing damages sustained by tribes. The
role of the trust responsibility in alleviating the consequences of these
unprofitable agreements is central to determining whether the trust
responsibility is a meaningful remedial mechanism under IMDA, but the
contours of this trust obligation seemingly still lack unified definition.
The Secretary may be bound by other federal statutes existing outside
of an approved IMDA agreement. The agreements do not necessarily exist in
isolation, and the terms therein should thus not be viewed as laying out a fully
integrated financial framework for the contracting parties without first
considering these extraneous factors. This can work to the advantage or
disadvantage of tribes, and it certainly begs consideration of the fact that IMDA
expressly states that the Act does not limit federal responsibility over tribes in
any way.
Importantly, § 2103(e) of the Act absolves the United States from
liability for any losses that tribes sustain from a mineral agreement that has
been approved by the Secretary. However, IMDA itself has an enumerated
trust provision: "the Secretary shall continue to have a trust obligation to ensure

63

25 U.S.C. § 2103(e).
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that the rights of a tribe or individual Indian are protected in the event of a
violation of the terms of any Minerals Agreement by any other party to such
agreement," and "nothing in this chapter shall absolve the United States from
any responsibility to Indians, including those which derive from the trust
relationship and from any treaties, Executive orders, or agreement between the
United States and any Indian tribe."" The desire embodied in IMDA to
preserve the federal trust relationship is significant in that tribal landowners
recognized a certain value in the trust relationship that would offset the
attendant complications of continued federal oversight and approval. But the
question as to what the tribes actually received for ceding full energy
sovereignty in return for the federal trust responsibility remains.
IV. IRRECONCILABLE PREMISES: THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE AND THE
FEDERAL INDIAN TRUST RESPONSIBILITY

The Indian energy question shines a light on the interplay between the
plenary power doctrine and the federal Indian trust responsibility.
Congressional authority for legislating Indian energy resources sounds in the
plenary power doctrine, a premise tied to the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, which authorizes the United States to "regulate commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."65
The plenary power doctrine also finds substantial roots in the famed trio of
early American Indian Law cases now known as the "Marshall Trilogy," in
which the Supreme Court laid a broad but enduringly influential foundation for
defining the legal relationship between the United States and Indian tribes.
Perhaps the most influential case among this trio in terms of establishing a
conceptual backdrop for what became the plenary power doctrine was
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.66 In its Cherokee Nation opinion, the Court

christened Indian tribes "domestic dependent nations" and described the
relationship between Indian tribes and the United States as resembling that of a
"ward to his guardian." 6 7 This language has played a significant role in
vindicating the United States' expansive and, at times, overbearing authority
over tribes under the plenary power doctrine.
The genesis of the federal government's involvement in the mineral
resources of tribes can be traced at least to the Cherokee Nation decision, and
the legal canon describing a "trust relationship" between Indian tribes and the
United States.6 8 Marshall's reasoning that Indian tribes are "domestic

65

Id.
U.S. CONST. art. I,

66

30 U.S. 1 (1831).

67

Id at 17.
See Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21
L. REv. 500 (1969); Judith V. Royster, Equivocal Obligations: The Federal-TribalTrust

6

68

STAN.

§ 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
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dependent nations" and his re-characterization of the inherently sovereign
relationship Indian tribes have toward the United States federal government to
ward-guardian quantified the parameters of what is still law today: Tribes
cannot be trusted to fully own their land and resources, and the responsibility
for these riches is vested in the United States as trustee.
The conceptual underpinnings of Justice Marshall's decision lie in the
Doctrine of Discovery, namely, that the United States, having discovered the
land, had rights to its title.70 At the time, the United States regularly had
engaged in the process of treaty making and bargained-for, if not equitable,
exchanges with tribes for their lands. The treaty-making practice ended in 1871
with the passage of the Indian Appropriations Act, whereby Congress ceased to
recognize tribes within the United States as independent nations "with whom
the United States may contract by treaty."71
Case law following the Marshall Trilogy has both confirmed the
existence of and expounded upon the plenary power and attendant trust
doctrines. In the 1886 case United States v. Kagama,7 2 the U.S. Supreme Court
decided that Congress possessed statutory jurisdictional authority to punish an
Indian for murdering another Indian within reservation boundaries. 73 In its
opinion, the Court used language reflecting the "ward to his guardian"
perception from Cherokee Nation, stating that the "power of the general
government over these remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and
diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety
of those among whom they dwell." 74 Though the Kagama Court did not
explicitly refer to a "plenary power" over tribes, this articulation of the federal
government's wardship powers has been cited by courts as a foundational
precedent when invoking the plenary power doctrine.7 5 Further, since the

Relationship and Conflicts ofInterest in the Development ofMineralResources, 71 N.D. L. REV.
327 (1995); see also Kevin Gover, An Indian Trust for the Twenty-First Century, 46 NAT.

RESOURCES J. 317, 361 (2006).
69
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
70
See generally ROBERT J. MILLER ET

AL., DISCOVERING INDIGENOUS LANDS: THE DOCTRINE

3-9 (2010).
Indian Appropriations Act of 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 566. See generally Gover, supra note
68; Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Attributes of Native Sovereignty: A New Trust
Paradigmfor FederalActionsAffecting TribalLands andResources, 1995 UTAH L. REv. 109.
72
118 U.S. 375 (1886).
OF DISCOVERY IN THE ENGLISH COLONIES
7'

n

Id.

74

Id. at 384.

7
See Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 485-86 (1899); see also Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566-67 (1903); Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy
Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 180-81 (2002) (explaining how the term
"plenary power" was first used in reference to congressional power over Indian affairs in
Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, in which the Court derived its finding of plenary power from the
"wardship power announced in Kagama").
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Court's 1903 opinion in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, Congress has enjoyed
judicially-created exclusive plenary power over all Indian-related matters, and
any legal or moral obligations the federal government has toward Indians
constraining the actions of Congress are for Congress to decide.
Indian people and tribes remain heavily regulated by policies formed as
a result of congressional delegation. Though Article I of the United States
Constitution vests Congress generally with "all legislative powers," Congress
may delegate legislative authority to the executive branch as long as there is an
"intelligible principle" attached to this legislative authority. This standard has
not proven particularly burdensome; as of 2001 only two statutes had been
found lacking in adequate guidance for a constitutionally sound delegation of
authority.
V. EROSION OF THE FEDERAL INDIAN TRUST DOCTRINE AS APPLIED TO THE
FEDERAL TRIBAL ENERGY REGIME

Indian law scholars have long wrestled with the notion of a conflicted
Indian trustee, whose responsibility to the public at large trumps and whose
fiduciary obligation to Indians remains subject to limitation, while
simultaneously functioning as a constraint on tribal self-determination.
Sarah Krakoff s A Narrative of Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox
of the Domestic Dependent Nation points out that domestic dependent nations
are "unique and paradoxical constructions" that have led to baffling judicial
fluctuations regarding the meaning and extent of "sovereignty" in the uniquely
American Indian context.79 There are thus significant implications as to how
the international view on the relationship between indigenous communities and
governing states is conceived. The nature of aspirations surrounding this
relationship as it exists on a human rights and global scale may help provide
some constructive perspective upon the complex entanglement of conflicting
ideas that defines the domestic relationship between Indian tribes and the
federal government.
In her article The Conflict Between the "Public Trust" and "Indian
Trust" Doctrines: Federal Public Land Policy and Native Nations, Rebecca
Tsosie describes the historical framework establishing a trust relationship
76
Lone Wolf 187 U.S. at 565-66; see also Gover, supra note 68, at 318-19 (stating that the
plenary power of Congress has "evolved" into a mechanism by which Congress can deprive
Indians of their property without considering their interests).
7
J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) ("If Congress shall
lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix
such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of
legislative power."); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
78
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001).
79
Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative of Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox of the Domestic
Dependent Nation, 83 OR. L. REv. 1109 (2004).
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between the federal government and the American public in the treatment of
lands.80 She points to the fact that courts used "trust language" not only in
maintaining federal ownership of land for the purposes of facilitating expansion
in the early history of the United States, but also in justifying federal control
over land disposition and natural resource management in order to sustain the
viability of public lands in the 19th century. 8 1
Tsosie aptly recognizes the public trust doctrine cannot be conflated
with an Indian trust doctrine, as the public trust doctrine sits as more of a
reflection of public policy than as a distinct legal doctrine with obligations
flowing from binding treaties and laws. 82 The political picture is even more
complicating for tribes: the public whose interest is being served has
"conveniently overlooked the fact that federal 'public lands' are the same lands
that were appropriated from Native people by military force during ... the
nineteenth century."83 As Tsosie points out, the federal government has
appropriated Native lands for "homesteading, grazing, mining, railroads,
national parks, reclamation projects, and military installations," demonstrating
the development of a national economic infrastructure arising without
meaningful consideration of Indian interests. 84 Additionally, with land having a
significant cultural and spiritual element to many Indian communities, it is
important to consider conceptual appropriations of land and natural resources
so
Rebecca Tsosie, The Conflict Between the "Public Trust" and "Indian Trust" Doctrines:
FederalPublic Land Policy and Native Nations, 39 TULSA L. REV. 271, 272, 301-10 (2003).
1
Id. (explaining that this kind of language was used by courts to "justify federal plenary
power to protect public lands").
82
Id. at 281-82 (citing Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public
LandLaw,
14 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 269 (1980)).
83
Id. at 284.
84
See id. (explaining that Indians have historically not been considered "stakeholders" in
debates over public land policy while "developers, recreationalists, environmentalists, and
industrialists" have all participated in this policy development discourse); see also DAVID
SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH
DELEGATION 4-9 (1993) (describing how Congress is able to delegate legislative duties to the
executive branch in order to get its way without being held politically accountable for the actions
involved in meeting its self-serving desires). Schoenbrod uses Sunkist to exemplify this
phenomenon. Sunkist, the "dominant marketer and processor of California and Arizona citrus
fruit," has very much been the beneficiary of a law enacted by the Secretary of Agriculture
known as an agricultural marketing order. SCHOENBROD, supra, at 6. This law increases the
amount consumers pay for oranges by "restricting the amount that growers may supply." Id at 4.
When confronting the question of how a law that "seemed to benefit so few at the expense of so
many" could be held up for any significant period of time, Schoenbrod explains that delegating
the responsibility for the enactment of agricultural marketing orders to the executive branch
allows Sunkist, a large company that hires political lobbyists, to get the law it wants without
"provid[ing] effective ammunition to a political opponent." Id. at 7-8. This case study aptly
demonstrates how delegation can be a legislative loophole allowing members of Congress to
appeal to entities they perceive as the most politically significant, even at the expense of other
constituents.
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(such as doctrines of property law that help define property as alienable and
marketable among individuals) that do not accord with the value that Indians
may derive therefrom.8 1 Given the complicated set of these facts and issues, it
becomes evident that Congress faces potentially irreconcilable conflicts of
interest in simultaneous execution of the Indian trust responsibility and the
public trust doctrine in its management of energy and natural resources.
According to the 2010 Census, there are only about 5.2 million people
in the United States (within a total U.S. population of 308.7 million) who
identified themselves as American Indian or Alaska Native. 6 Furthermore, the
Census revealed that the vast majority of those who identified themselves as
American Indian or Alaska Native reside in one of only ten states. These
numbers indicate two important realities: First, American Indians make up only
a small piece of the greater population represented by Congress, and second,
most states have a proportionately miniscule Indian representation even in light
of the relatively small overall numbers. On an electoral basis, Congress's
interest in appealing to its numerical constituency would not necessarily require
consideration of Indian interests.8 8
This idea of needing to adhere to a non-majoritarian set of values for
Federal Indian law is captured within American jurisprudence. For example,
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in United States v. Lara8 9 reflects a judicial
trend of "quasi-constitutionalism," or the application of "constitutional values
in constructing a federal common law pertaining to tribes." 9 0

85

See Kristen A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal & Angela R. Riley, In Defense ofProperty, 118

YALE L.J. 1022, 1039-40 (2009) (using Eric Posner's assertion in The InternationalProtectionof
CulturalProperty: Some Skeptical Observations that cultural property should be viewed in the
context of its free market value as a means of exhibiting the "theoretical paucity of current law
and economics theory to grapple with heavily contested claims to indigenous cultural
resources").
86

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE POPULATION: 2010, at

1-3 (2012), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br- 10.pdf.
87

Id. at 6.

See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("[W]hether
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
88

protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.");
see also Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Congress and Indians, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 77 (2015)

(suggesting that further research is needed in reviewing the impact and scope of congressional
action towards Indian and tribes).
89
541 U.S. 193 (2004).
90
See Anne E. Tweedy, Connecting the Dots Between the Constitution, the Marshall
Trilogy, and United States v. Lara: Notes Toward a Blueprint for the Next Legislative
Restoration of Tribal Sovereignty, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 651, 699-701, 712 (2009)

(discussing Phillip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial
Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE J. L. 1, 65 (1999)). In

presenting various methodologies for drafting restorative jurisdictional legislation that could
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Fundamentally, the Lara Court upheld the concept of inherent tribal
sovereignty.9 ' The idea that there exists an inherent sovereignty that extends
beyond tribal boundaries to Indians as a whole could suggest that the Judiciary
has embraced an essentialist mindset regarding the sovereignty of Indian
peoples within the United States.
The inherent sovereignty aspect of Lara can be seen as reflective of a
U.S. framework within which tribes are bound in trying to assert sovereign
rights, even those that are also seen as fundamental within the international law
doctrine. The implications of Lara in the context of incorporating international
human rights law as a restoration of sovereignty among tribes in the United
States may set a jurisprudential path to recognizing international indigenous
human rights norms in United States law. 92
In 1980, the Supreme Court handed down United States v. Mitchell

(Mitchell 1),93 disavowing the creation of a trust relationship in Congress's
Indian General Allotment Act of 1877.94 The Mitchell Court, for the first time,
feasibly be held up by the Judiciary, Tweedy suggests that the incorporation of core
constitutional values such as equal protection and right to counsel should be accounted for in
light of the Court's agenda of quasi-constitutionalism. This aspect of Lara could be reflective of
the domestic framework within which tribes are bound in trying to assert sovereign rights
generally, and those made available through emerging international law doctrine. The
implications of Lara in the context of incorporating international human rights law as a
restoration of sovereignty among tribes in the United States could influence the methodologies of
indigenous human rights advocates in the United States for other reasons as well. Id.; see also
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693-94 (1990) ("Our cases suggest constitutional limitations even
on the ability of Congress to subject American citizens to criminal proceedings before a tribunal
that does not provide constitutional protections as a matter of right." (citing Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1 (1957))); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: Clear
Statement Rules as ConstitutionalLawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992).
91
Lara, 541 U.S. at 199 (finding that Indian tribes had the power to prosecute other Indians,
even those who were not members of that tribe, as a product of inherent tribal sovereignty and
citing to Yakima in invoking the "plenary and exclusive" powers of Congress to "legislate in
respect to Indian tribes, vesting Congress with the exclusive authority to both restrict and relax
tribes' inherent prosecutorial authority"). Together, these rulings suggest that congressional
authority over the affairs of tribes extends even to tribal rights that the Court has, at least
nominally, acknowledged as "fundamental" or "inherent" to the tribes, yet still subject to
congressional will. See also Tweedy, supra note 90.
92
See Rebecca Tsosie, Reconceptualizing Tribal Rights: Can Self-Determination Be
Actualized Within the U.S. ConstitutionalStructure?, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 923, 942 (2011)
(discussing Justice Thomas's dissent in Lara and describing the "paradox" of inherent
sovereignty and plenary power as "a prominent feature of the dialogue on indigenous selfdetermination").
9
445 U.S. 535 (1980).
94
Id. at 542. The Supreme Court had just reaffirmed the extensive reach of Congress's
plenary power over tribes in the prior term, in 1979, with its ruling in Washington v.
Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, holding that a Washington statute that
obligated the state to "assume civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indians and Indian territory
within the State" subject to certain conditions was constitutional notwithstanding the argument
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determined that the trust relationship is dependent on the congressional intent
in creating the trust:
It is plain, then, that when Congress enacted the General
Allotment Act, it intended that the United States "hold the
land . . in trust" not because it wished the Government to
control use of the land and be subject to money damages for
breaches of fiduciary duty, but simply because it wished to
prevent alienation of the land and to ensure that allottees would
95
be immune from state taxation.
Even though the General Allotment Act expressly stated that certain
land was to be held "in trust" for the Indians to better accord with its
understanding of congressional intent, the Court found the language to be
subject to qualification. According to the Court, Congress statutorily obliged
the federal government to hold the land in trust "not because it wished the
Government to control use of the land and be subject to money damages for
breaches of fiduciary duty, but simply because it wished to prevent alienation
of the land and to ensure that allottees would be immune from the state
taxation." 97 The Court referred to this new federal responsibility as a "limited
trust." 98

The application of the "limited trust" came a year after IMDA's
passage; in 1983, Mitchell plaintiffs brought a second action to the Court under
the Indian Tucker Act, in a case commonly known as Mitchell II.99 When the
Mitchell II plaintiffs sued the United States for monetary damages, they
invoked the Tucker Act to effect waiver of sovereign immunity by the United
States.100 But prevailing on an Indian Tucker Act damage claim also requires
the Court to interpret the statutes and regulations in question to be "reasonably

that the statute abridged the tribes' "fundamental right" to self-government. 439 U.S. 463, 463,
500-01 (1979). This finding was based upon the fact that the Washington statute was authorized
by an act of Congress, and that "Congress, in the exercise of its plenary power over Indian
affairs, may restrict the retained sovereign powers of the Indian tribes." Id.
9
Mitchell I, 445 U.S. at 544.
96
Id. at 543.
9
Id. at 544.
98
Id. at 542. The Court expounds upon this notion of a limited trust by stating that "[tihe Act
does not unambiguously provide that the United States has undertaken full fiduciary
responsibilities as to the management of allotted lands." Id.; see also Lynn H. Slade, The Federal
Trust Responsibility and Tribal-PrivateNatural Resource Development 8 (Modrall, Sperling,
Roehl, Harris, & Sisk, P.A., Paper 13B) (connecting the idea of the limited trust with the Court's
conclusion that the General Allotment Act provided that the allottees were to have use and
occupation of allotted land and thus management thereof).
9
United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell ll), 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
100
Id.
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amenable to the reading that it mandates a right of recovery in damages."'o' In
this sense, Mitchell II represented a mere compartmentalization of a certain
type of trust responsibility claim. It utilized the idea that there does exist a
general trust relationship, but did so in a manner that was in pragmatic
accordance with the doctrine of sovereign immunity.1 02
In its opinion in Mitchell II, the Court found that federal timber
management statutes did indeed confer a fiduciary duty upon the federal
government to manage tribal timber resources. 03 "In contrast to the bare trust
created by the General Allotment Act," the Court stated, "the statutes and
regulations now before us clearly give the federal government full
responsibility to manage Indian resources and land for the benefit of the
Indians."l04 The Court also asserted that construing the timber management
statutes as created fiduciary duties was "reinforced" by an "undisputed
existence of a general trust relationship between the United States and the
Indianpeople."

05

Mitchell II itself was not per se damaging to the trust responsibility. At
the time, it may have seemed the two Justices Marshall reached across the
centuries in their Indian law jurisprudence: the express acknowledgement in
Mitchell II by Justice Thurgood Marshall's majority opinion of a general
Federal trust obligation hearkened directly back to the trust precedent set by the
Justice John Marshall opinion in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.10 6 However, the
foundation for further erosion nonetheless lay in the Mitchell II opinion. The
reasoning of Mitchell ll was different; it was not "general" at all, rather, it was
"[t]he language of these statutory and regulatory provisions" that "directly
supports the existence of a fiduciary relationship."', 07 Mitchell II actually
undermined the very relationship it confirmed by relying instead on specific
statutory construction rather than a stand-alone doctrine with its own distinct

1o1

United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 473 (2003).
See Mitchell ll, 463 U.S at 218 ("In this case, however, there is simply no question that the
Tucker Act provides the United States' consent to suit for claims founded upon statutes or
regulations that create substantive rights to money damages. If a claim falls within this category,
the existence of a waiver of sovereign immunity is clear.").
103
Id. at 224.
102

104

Id.

Id. at 225 (emphasis added).
106
Id. at 225-26 (citing United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 398 (1973); Seminole Nation
v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296 (1942); Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 386
(1939); United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 117-18 (1938); United States v.
Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 442 (1926); McKay v. Kalyton, 204 U.S. 458, 469 (1907); Minnesota
v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 396 (1902); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 382-84 (1886);
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831)).
105

107

Id at 224.
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legal implications. 08 This departure from the nature of the trust relationship
conceptualized in Seminole Nation and subversion to statute laid the framework
for the Court's later reliance on statutory language in determining whether
federal trust duties to Indian tribes exist at all.
Importantly, the limitations of the trust responsibility, as well as its
attendant rights and remedies, have been further contoured by the courts in
cases where a tribe has alleged a breach of federal trust in the context of IMDA.
For example, in Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma v. United States,10 9 a
panel of judges from the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found an abuse
of discretion and failure to adhere to fiduciary duties where the Secretary of the
Interior approved communitization agreements on Indian land but failed to
consider the market conditions and marketability of leases prior to the oil and
mineral "boom" period immediately preceding these communization
agreements. 0 The court stated general principles regarding review of agency
decisions must be applied in light of the Secretary of Interior's fiduciary
responsibilities to the Indians."' However, the court, applying IMDA, found
that the actionable breach of trust took place during the approval process, and
issued an injunction to prevent enforcement of the agreements in question. 112
When the tribe filed a subsequent suit for damages for breach of trust against
the United States, the tribe could find no remedy, as their action was barred due
to issue preclusion." 3
In 1986, in Quantum Exploration, Inc. v. Clark,"l4 the Ninth Circuit
held that an agreement under IMDA is "entirely dependent" upon Secretarial
approval,"'5 and that a tribe may rescind a proposed agreement when Secretarial
approval is still pending."'6 The appeals court distinguished the case from

108

Id.; see also Curtis G. Berkey, Rethinking the Role of the FederalTrust Responsibility in

ProtectingIndian Land and Resources, 83 DENV. U. L. REv. 1069, 1070 (2006) (explaining that
the affirmation of a general trust relationship has not helped the courts much in defining the

contours of federal obligations, one judicial concern being the "endors[ment]" of a "legal theory
that might subject the federal treasury to a flood of money damage awards"); Slade, supra note
98, at 8 (fiduciary duties "do not ordinarily arise ... from the general trust relationship").
109
966 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1992).
110

Id. at 589-91.

II

Id. at 589. The Court also suggested that in approving mineral agreements, it is the

Secretary's trust responsibility to understand the particularized circumstances surrounding the

land at issue and how these circumstances could ultimately affect the economic gains of the tribe
under the proposed agreement. Id.
112

See Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 464, 466 (1995).

113

Id. at 466-70.

114

780 F.2d 1457 (9th Cir. 1986).

"

Id at 1459.
Id. at 1461.

116
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Yavapai-PrescottIndian Tribe v. Watt,' in which it earlier ruled that a tribe
could not unilaterally terminate an agreement that had already been formally
approved by the Secretary.' 18 Therefore, an agreement under IMDA is not valid
unless the Secretary approves it, but once so approved, it becomes binding.11 9
The Court adjudicated the statutory or general issue in 2011 with
United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation,' another case arising under the
Indian Tucker Act. In Jicarilla,the Court spoke broadly about the status of the
federal trust responsibility, attenuating the compartmentalizing effect of
Mitchell II and Navajo Nation.12 1 In Jicarilla,the tribe sued the United States
for mismanagement of its assets held in trust by the United States. 122 In the
lawsuit, the tribe sought documents that the United States claimed attorneyclient privileged and shielded from disclosure to the tribe. 12 3 The tribe argued
that the fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege rule should apply
because of the federal government's status as trustee to the tribe. 124 Even
though the Jicarillaquestion was particular in nature, the Court nonetheless
held broadly, declaring that "[t]he Government assumes Indian trust
responsibilities only to the extent it expressly accepts those responsibilities by
statute." The Court acknowledged that "[t]hroughout the history of the Indian
trust relationship, we have recognized that the organization and management of
the trust is a sovereign function subject to the plenary authority of Congress." 26
Yet, in determining whether or not to apply common-law trust principles to the
tribe's claim that the federal government mismanaged their trust funds, the
Jicarilla Court, while acknowledging the "undisputed existence of a general
trust relationship between the United States and the Indian People,"1 27 went on
to state that the "Government assumes Indian trust responsibilities only to the
extent it expressly accepts those responsibilities by statute." 2 8 This language

707 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1983).
Id.; see also Quantum Expl., 780 F.2d at 1460.
119
The line of cases that further created boundaries for the trust responsibility were brought
under the Indian Tucker Act. The Indian Tucker Act gave the U.S. Court of Federal Claims
jurisdiction over a claim by an Indian tribe against the United States when "such claim is one
arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." See Indian Tucker Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1505 (2013).
120
131 S. Ct. 2313 (2011).
i17

11

121
122

Id

d. at 2315.

123

Id

124

Id
Id. at 2325.
Id. at 2324.
Id.
Id. at 2325.

125
126
127
128
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suggests not only that the clout of the trust responsibility is circumscribed by
the plenary power doctrine, but also that specific federal obligations under the
trust responsibility are limited to those which are affirmatively conferred by
Congress. The Court went on to explain that "the Government exercises its
carefully delimited trust responsibilities in a sovereign capacity to implement
national policy respecting the Indian tribes," quashing any doubt that any
seemingly defining aspects of the trust relationship are fleeting in nature and
subject to the sole deference of the government it supposedly obliges.' 29
With the Federal trust responsibility toward Indians now more or less
cabined as duties expressly established by statutory language, Congress finds
itself in the enviable position of creating its own power checks.13 With the
statutory reliance and plenary power framework in place, several conflicts of
interest are omnipresent, many of which can and have proven damaging or fatal
to the trust relationship. These conflicts involve friction between the trust
relationship and other congressional duties and considerations, including (but
not necessarily limited to) political self-interest, federal policy favoring selfdetermination, and the public trust regarding land and natural resource
management.
In 1995, in Utah v. Babbitt,'3 1 Utah sued to compel royalty tax
payments from oil and gas production on the Navajo reservation. In that case,
which analyzed a 1933 congressional Act that took 552,000 acres from the
public domain in Utah and added it to the Navajo reservation, a percentage of
Id. at 2326. The expansive nature of the language used in JicarillaApache may be
attributable to a widespread trend of judicial misuse of case law arising under the Tucker Act.
See Mary Christina Wood, Indian Trust Responsibility: Protecting Tribal Lands and Resources
Through Claims of Injunctive Relief Against Federal Agencies, 39 TULSA L. REv. 355, 364-68
(2003) (arguing that recent claims for injunctive relief that have arisen under the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA") have been wrongfully subjected to the Tucker Act standard of seeking
specific federal statutes and regulations as the primary source for trust duties). The APA makes
unlawful any agency action that is "arbitrary, capricious, [an abuse of discretion,] 'or otherwise
not in accordance with law."' Id. at 362. Wood asserts that the APA establishes a standard that is
different from the Indian Tucker Act in that it does not require a trust responsibility claim to be
founded in express law, but that this distinction has been blurred by courts using a Tucker-based
analysis on APA claims and thereby establishing a flawed stare decisis upon which future courts
rely. Id. at 364-66. This trend is particularly concerning when viewed in light of the transcendent
nature of the "trust" concept as it seemed to be understood in Seminole Nation, because adhering
to strict statute-based standards does not leave adequate room for courts to consider the
foundational moral justifications upon which the idea that there exists a trust relationship
originated.
130
See Gover, supra note 68, at 355-56 (describing statutes as "defining" the trust
responsibility and explaining that the Judiciary has been "unwilling to read into the trust statutes
something as basic as the obligation of good faith and fidelity in the absence of specific statutory
language"); see also JicarillaApache Nation, 131 S. Ct. at 2325 (stating that the Government's
trust duties are limited to the extent by which the Government "expressly accepts those
responsibilities by statute").
'1
53 F.3d 1145 (10th Cir. 1995).
129
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oil and gas royalties from this land was to be paid to the State of Utah, which
was in turn to use the tax on the "health, education, and general welfare of the
Navajo Indians residing in San Juan County."1 32 The Navajo Nation entered an
operating agreement, approved by the Secretary under IMDA, with Chuska
Energy Co., an oil and gas operator on the property in question. The State of
Utah still demanded royalty tax from oil and gas production by Chuska, but
Chuska argued that the 1933 Act did not apply to operating agreements. 33 The
district court held, in part, that it remained the duty of the Secretary to collect
these royalties and give them to the state of Utah.1 34 One of the questions faced
by the circuit court was whether it was a violation of IMDA to require the
Secretary to collect and distribute these royalties under the federal statute (the
idea being that contracting parties under IMDA can designate a third party
other than the Secretary to collect royalties).' 35 However, there was no evidence
that any such third-party designation was made by the contracting parties.1 3 6
Therefore, requiring the Secretary to continue to collect royalties was not a
violation of IMDA.1 37
It remains an open jurisprudential question whether a tribal private
right of action seeking to void leases with third parties to seek redress under
IMDA is plausible. However, the fundamental tenet that no interest in Indian
tribal property held in trust by the United States may be conveyed absent the
consent of Congress is instructive.' 38 Indian property may not be alienated
absent the consent of the United States as supreme sovereign.' 3 9 Moreover, the
regulation of trade and intercourse between Indian tribes and non-Indians is
exclusively the province of federal law, embodied in the Indian commerce
clause of the United States Constitution and the Trade and Intercourse Act of
1790, which gave way to the Non-Intercourse Act.1 4 0 The Non-Intercourse Act
comprises the essential predicate to a Tribal right of action against IMDA,
when considered within the Supreme Court's holdings in OneidaIndian Nation
of New York v. County of Oneida (Oneida 1)141 and County of Oneida v. Oneida
Indian Nation of New York (OneidaII). 142

132

Id. at 1147.

133

Id

134

Id. at 1148.
Id. at 1151.
Id.
Id

135
136

137

138
139
140

141
142

See Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 573-74 (1823).
Id.
25 U.S.C. § 177 (2013).
414 U.S. 661 (1974).
470 U.S. 226 (1985).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2015

25

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 118, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 8
814

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118

In Oneida I, the Supreme Court held that the tribe stated a claim for
possession under federal law for jurisdictional purposes when it brought suit
seeking damages representing the fair rental value of land that had been
conveyed in violation of the trade and intercourse act.1 4 3 In Oneida II, the Court
held that Indian tribes have a private right of action under federal common law
to seek damages against trespassers who unlawfully occupied their lands
without federal authorization.1" In the course of its holding, the Court
discussed the underpinning of a private right of action as follows:
With the adoption of the Constitution, Indian relations became
the exclusive province of federal law. From the first Indian
claims presented, this Court recognized the aboriginal rights of
the Indians to their lands ...

and stated that the Indians' right

of occupancy is "as sacred as the fee simple of the whites."
Thus, as we concluded in Oneida I, the possessory right
claimed [by the Oneidas] is afederal right to the lands at issue
in this case. 45
The Court went on to state that the right of Indian tribes to sue to
enforce their property rights has been recognized throughout history in
numerous cases. 14 Noting that the Indian right of occupancy need not be based
upon treaty statute or other formal government action, the Court held that
"absent federal statutory guidance, the governing rule of decision would be
fashioned by the federal court in the mode of the common law."47 This
suggests a private right of action may sound in voiding Indian mineral
agreements not approved by the Secretary because, conceptually, the reasoning
lies in the laws restrict the alienation of tribal property generally, as well as
pendant actions that might be brought under federal common law.
The Second Circuit had held that the Oneida tribe had a private right of
action under both federal common law and the Non-Intercourse Act.' 4 The
circuit court reasoned that the fact that the act was enacted to protect Indian
property and that private remedy was part of the contemporary legal context in
which Congress legislated, Congress must have intended that they would be
enforced by private actions since they were clearly intended to benefit the
tribes.1 49 The opinion went on to conclude that the tribes still had a private right

143

14
145
146

147
148

149

Oneida I, 414 U.S. at 665.
Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 233-37.
Id. at 234-35 (citations omitted).
Id. at 235-36.
Id. (quoting Oneida 1, 414 U.S. at 674).
Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Cty. of Oneida, 719 F.2d 525, 530-37 (2d Cir. 1983).
Id. at 532-33.
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of action to enforce the Non-Intercourse Act.1 50 However, the Supreme Court
did not reach the Second Circuit's holding, because it found the tribe had a
remedy to protect its property rights under the federal common law.' 5
However, it seems plausible that the same reasoning that gives rise to a tribal
private right of action to seek adjudication under the Non-Intercourse Act
would also apply to IMDA, as a similar statute that enumerates the
circumstances under which Indian property can and cannot be alienated.
The line of Supreme Court cases contemplating the nature of the Indian
trust obligation held by United States vis-d-vis Indian tribes and as applied to
the tribal energy statutes demonstrate that the plenary power doctrine can
employ or dispense with the trust requirement. Given the current status of the
trust relationship as embodied only where it is specifically stated within federal
statutes and regulations, it is difficult to view the trust relationship as a
constant-neither beneficial to tribes or a meaningful check on the plenary
power held by Congress over Indian affairs. What is clear is that federal
oversight has negative impacts on tribal energy development. 152
VI. TERAS: HORSETRADING TRUST FOR SOVEREIGNTY

As the trust relationship has begun to show its tenuousness in the
courts, tribes have persisted in their quest for further autonomy from the United
States in their resource development. As a component of the Energy Policy Act
of 2005, Congress established a procedure for a separate tranche of Indian
mineral agreements that would no longer be subject to the constraints of
IMDA. Section 3504 of the 2005 Act declares "an Indian tribe may, at the
discretion of the Indian tribe, enter into a lease or business agreement for the
purpose of energy resource development on tribal land."'53 The statute further
establishes a procedure for Secretarial approval of tribal energy resource
agreements ("TERAs") that would authorize a tribe's approval of leases,
business agreements, etc.' 5 4 This procedure sets forth response-time
requirements and a fixed set of conditions under which the Secretary must
approve a proposed TERA, thereby placing boundaries on Secretarial discretion
150

Id. at 533-37.

Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 233-36. For a more comprehensive exploration of tribal rights of
actions generally, compare Seth Davis, Tribal Rights of Action, 45 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv.
499 (2014).
152
See 2015 GAO REPORT, supra note 1; Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Sovereignty and
Nation-Building:The Development Challenge in Indian Country Today, 22 AM. INDIAN CULTURE
& REs. J. 187, 188 (1998).
15
Energy Policy Act of 2005, 25 U.S.C. § 3504(a)(1) (2013); see also Tribal Energy SelfSufficiency Act and Native American Energy Development and Self-DeterminationAct: Hearing
Before the Comm. of Indian Affairs, 108th Cong. 70-72 (2003) (statement of Theresa Rosier,
Counselor to the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs).
154
25 U.S.C. § 3504(e).
151
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to dictate the timing and terms by which a tribe could engage in mineral
resource development. 5 5 Notably, these conditions require the Secretary to
approve of a TERA if, along with conditions relating to the completeness of the
agreement terms being met, the "Indian tribe has sufficient capacity to regulate
the development of energy resources of the Indian tribe." 5 6 The statutory
language calls for the Secretary to be mindful of tribal capabilities on a broad
level, and the term "capacity" connotes not just present capabilities but future
potential as well. 5 7 In this sense, the TERA approval procedures promote
sovereignty not only by limiting Secretarial discretion, but also by widening the
scope through which the Secretary is to perceive tribal capabilities to manage
their resources. However, the provisions continue to vest the Secretary with
ultimate decision-making authority as to whether tribes pass muster to manage
their own assets.
The TERA scheme created in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 has
brought with it concerns that the trust aspect of Indian mineral development has
been diminished to a degree that will prove debilitating to Indians. In Tribal
Energy Resource Agreements: Tools for Achieving Energy Development and
Tribal Self-Sufficiency or an Abdication of Federal Environmental and Trust
Responsibilities?, Andrea S. Miles identifies some of the viewpoints of those
who oppose the TERA scheme, such as concerns over the negotiating power of
Indians in dealing with energy development companies and fears that a lack of
federal oversight from an environmental perspective could end up being
detrimental to tribal lands and natural resources. 58 Miles points out that the
155

Id.

§ 3504(e)(2)(A). The Section states the following:

Not later than 270 days after the date on which the Secretary receives a tribal
energy resource agreement from an Indian tribe under paragraph (1), or not
later than 60 days after the Secretary receives a revised tribal energy resource
agreement from an Indian tribe under paragraph (4)(C) (or a later date, as
agreed to by the Secretary and the Indian tribe), the Secretary shall approve
or disapprove the tribal energy resource agreement.
Id. Section 3504(e)(2)(B) contains the factors requiring Secretarial approval of the proposed
TERA.
156
Id. § 3504(e)(2)(B).
157
See 25 C.F.R. § 224.72 (2015). These regulations require the Secretary to account for both
the past-i.e. the tribe's "past performance administering contracts and grants associated with
self-determination programs" and future potential-i.e. the "financial capacity of the tribe to
maintain or procure the technical expertise needed to evaluate proposals and to monitor
anticipated activities in a prudent manner." Id. Black's Law Dictionary does not contain an
encompassing definition of the term "capacity" as it is used in this context, but it does contain
definitions for certain legal types of capacity from which one can infer that "capacity" refers to
one's ability to perform some future action. Testamentary capacity, for example, is defined as
having the ability to recognize certain information in order to produce a valid will. Note that it
speaks to the ability to recognize, not actual recognition. See Testamentary Capacity, BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
158
Andrea S. Miles, Tribal Energy Resource Agreements: Tools for Achieving Energy
Development and Tribal Self-Sufficiency or an Abdication of FederalEnvironmental and Trust
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statute contains general language requiring the Secretary to act in accordance
with the federal trust responsibility, but the enumerated elements of the TERA
process certainly call into question whether there remains any genuine
substance to the trust relationship in Indian mineral resource development
under this system.' 59
Tribes have expressed support for a recently proposed piece of tribal
energy development legislation.1 60 If passed into law, this legislation could
significantly alter the landscape of tribal energy resource development and
instruct how tribes can take steps forward in using their energy resources as a
source of economic self-sufficiency. Senate Bill 2132 proposes several
substantial amendments to the Indian Tribal Energy Development and SelfDetermination Act, as it exists within the Energy Policy Act of 2005. Senate
Bill 2132 was first introduced on March 13, 2014, by John Barrasso, a
Republican Senator from Wyoming.' 6 ' Following a legislative hearing before
the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs on April 30 of the same year, the
Committee convened in a meeting on May 21, during which the Committee
approved of several amendments to the bill and ordered the bill to be reported
favorably to Congress.1 62 The bill was then reported to Congress on July 30,
2014,13 but it has yet to be enacted.
The proposed amendments to the Indian Tribal Energy Development
and Self-Determination Act presented in the bill offer several significant
changes to the law. By and large, these amendments surround three distinct, but
interrelated, categories: new requirements regarding federal participation in the
energy resource development process, changes to the TERA procedure, and the
new powers available to certified tribal energy development organizations.

Responsibilities?, 30 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 461, 464-70 (2006) (explaining how the shift in the
federal-tribe relationship disrupted the regulatory environmental framework pertaining to Indian
lands); see also Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593, 597 (10th Cir. 1972) (holding in part that "[t]he
fact Indian lands are held in trust does not take it out of NEPA's jurisdiction" under the rationale
that all "public lands" in the United States are held "in trust for the people of the United States");
Elizabeth Ann Kronk, TribalEnergy Resource Agreements: The Unintended "GreatMischieffor
Indian Energy Development" and the Resulting Need for Reform, 29 PACE ENvrL. L. REv. 811
(2012) (suggesting that TERAs either be subject to trust remedies or proceed with less federal
control). The trust relationship could herein be interpreted as establishing a common
characteristic between Indian land and other lands within the purview of federal environmental
regulations.
1
Miles, supra note 158, at 473 (citing Energy Policy Act of 2005, 25 U.S.C. §
3504(e)(6)(A)-(B)).
160
This Article does not take up H.R. 538, the "Native American Energy Act," which has
been recently introduced in the 114th Congress. See Native American Energy Act, H.R. 538,
114th Cong. (2015), https://www.congress.gov/bill/l 14th-congress/house-bill/538.
161
S. REP. No. 113-224, at 19 (2014).
162
Id
163
See generally id.
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Many of the amendments proposed in Senate Bill 2132 would make
changes to the degree and nature of federal participation in tribal energy
resource development. First, and perhaps most significantly for the purpose of
setting an impactful precedent, the bill contains a consultation clause requiring
the Secretary to "consult with each applicable Indian tribe before adopting or
approving a well spacing program or plan applicable to the energy resources of
that Indian tribe or the members of that Indian tribe."164 Second, the bill
provides for increased federal technical assistance to tribes at various stages in
the process of executing plans and programs for energy resource development.
At the capacity-building stage, the bill allows the Director of the Department of
Energy to provide grants to tribes in order to fund "activities to increase the
capacity of Indian tribes to manage energy development and energy efficiency
programs."1 6 5 At the planning stage, the bill requires that the Secretary provide
technical assistance to tribes in developing an energy plan,1 6 6 and finally, at the
implementation stage, the bill requires that the Secretary "collaborate with the
Directors of the National Laboratories" in ensuring that tribes have access to
the "full array of technical and scientific resources of the Department of
Energy."' 67 Through these provisions, Senate Bill 2132 acknowledges the
potential efficacy of federal participation to tribal energy resource development
and promotes constructive federal contributions at various stages of the
resource development process.
Senator Barrasso's bill makes several amendments to the established
TERA procedure as well. Notably, the TERA approval protocol is refrained
such that the bill, if enacted, would provide a limited set of circumstances
under which a Secretary would be permitted to disapprove of a TERA.'16 This
is in contrast with the current law, under which there are certain enumerated
circumstances where the Secretary is required to approve a TERA, but no other
limiting language setting definite contours to the Secretary's disapproval
power. 69

Aside from establishing new parameters on Secretarial discretion in
approving and disapproving a TERA, the bill also proposes several
amendments to the TERA approval process itself. Under the proposed
legislation, for example, TERAs are self-executing. That is, if the Secretary
fails to either approve or disapprove of a TERA within 271 days of receiving
the TERA or within 91 days of receiving a TERA revision, then the TERA
Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act Amendments of 2014, S.
2132, 113th Cong. § 101(a)(1)(E) (2014).
165
Id. § 101(b)(3).
166

167
168

Id. § 101(a)(2).
Id. § 104(2).
See id. § 103(a)(4)(B)(ii)(I).

Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act of 2005
§ 2604(e)(2)(B),
25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(B) (2013).
169
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70
automatically goes into effect.o
In terms of the approval process itself, the bill
requires the Secretary to make a preliminary capacity determination within 120
days of TERA submission by the tribe, allowing tribes the time to address
capacity concerns and resubmit their TERA early in the process.'"' The
proposed legislation requires a positive finding of capacity if the Secretary
determines that the tribe has, for at least three consecutive years prior to the
submission of the TERA, carried out a contract under Titles I and IV of the
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act without "material
audit exceptions" and which contains "programs or activities relating to the
management of tribal land." 7 2 As with TERA approval, this capacity
determination is self-executing in that the Secretary's failure to make a
determination within the 120 day time limit for a preliminary finding equates to
a positive finding of capacity.173
The bill's TERA amendments also provide greater incentives for tribes
to endeavor in the TERA process. For one, the amendments provide a funding
mechanism for tribes executing a TERA. Senate Bill 2132 provides for an
"annual written funding agreement that is negotiated and entered into with the
Indian tribe that is separate from the tribal energy resource agreement." 74
Through the terms of these mandated agreements, the Secretary would be
required to make payments available to tribes in order to compensate them for
the costs they have incurred while carrying out activities under their TERA that
would normally be incurred by the federal government if the tribe had not
75
obtained a TERA in the first place.s
This alleviates what tribes might
otherwise consider a strong economic disincentive to obtaining a TERA.
Moreover, the bill requires that the Secretary promulgate regulations within one
year of enactment that establish a process for "amending an existing tribal
energy resource agreement to assume authority for approving leases, businesses
agreements, or rights-of-way for development" that are not part of the original
TERA.1 7 6 This prevents tribes from feeling foreclosed by the terms of their
original TERA as the energy resource development process evolves over time.
It is also worthy to note that the bill's amendments to the TERA
process expound slightly upon the purported trust duties of the federal
government, amending the original Act to state that the "Secretary shall
continue to fulfill the trust obligation of the United States to perform the

170
171
172

S. 2132, § 103(a)(4)(B)(ii).
Id. § 103(a)(4)(B)(v).

173

Id
Id.

174

Id.

175

Id.

176

Id.

§ 103(a)(6).
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obligations of the Secretary under this section." 17 7 While the current Indian
Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act requires the Secretary
to fulfill the trust responsibility, it contains no specification that the
requirements set forth in the legislation itself fall within the scope of the trust
responsibility.' 78 Although this language does not necessarily shed new light
upon the role of the trust responsibility in modem law, it does demonstrate a
congressional acknowledgment that the trust responsibility can still encompass
new legislation.
Senate Bill 2132 also contains "add-ons" in the form of amendments to
existing pieces of legislation outside of the Indian Tribal Energy Development
and Self-Determination Act of 2005. Two notable add-ons as they relate to
ensuring that tribes have the opportunity to develop their own strategies for
resource development and general economic sustainability are the Indian
Energy Efficiency Program and the Weatherization Program. The
Weatherization Program is manifest in Senate Bill 2132 as an amendment to
the Energy Conservation Production Act, which, in relevant part, permits the
Secretary to provide grants to states and Indian tribal organizations to provide
"financial assistance with regard to projects designed to provide for the
weatherization of dwelling units."179 The amendment specifically pertains to
section 413(d) of the Act, which requires the Secretary to reserve a percentage
of grant funds otherwise allocated to the state for low-income Indians upon
determining that "low-income members of an Indian tribe are not receiving
benefits . . that are equivalent to the assistance provided to other low-income
persons in such State" and that "the members of such tribe would be better
served by means of a grant made directly to provide such assistance."so This
section is amended in a manner that gives tribes decision-making authority.
Specifically, the amendment states that the Secretary's obligation to reserve
funds for low-income Indians is inapplicable unless "the tribal organization
serving the low-income members of the applicable Indian tribe requests that the
Secretary make a grant directly." 8 ' This gives tribes the ultimate authority to
decide what type of funding would benefit them the most.
The Indian Energy Efficiency Program is manifest in Senate Bill 2132
as an amendment to title III, part D of the Energy Policy and Conservation
Act.1 8 2 This amendment does not alter the existing substance of the law, but
instead adds a new section establishing a minimum percentage for the

n

Id. § 103(a)(4)(D)(ii).

See Indian Tribal Energy Development
2604(a)(6)(C), 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(6)(C) (2013).
179
42 U.S.C. § 6863(a); S. 2132, § 203.
180
42 U.S.C. § 6863(d)(1).
178

181

182

and Self-Determination Act of 2005

§

S. 2132, § 203(1).
Id § 106.
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allocation of funds used to provide competitive grants to Indian tribes wishing
to implement projects and strategies that promote energy efficiency.183 This
program affords tribes the opportunity to receive funding for specific projects
that can engage, educate, and empower tribes and their members.
Perhaps the portion of Barrasso's bill with the greatest potential impact
is the establishment of a certification scheme for what the bill refers to as Tribal
Energy Development Organizations ("TEDO"s). The bill defines a TEDO
rather expansively as either "any enterprise, partnership, consortium,
corporation, or other type of business organization that is engaged in the
development of energy resources and is wholly owned by an Indian tribe" or
"any organization of 2 or more entities, at least 1 of which is an Indian tribe,
that has the written consent of the governing bodies of all Indian tribes
participating" to apply for financial assistance or "enter into a lease or business
agreement with, or acquire a right-of-way from, an Indian tribe pursuant to
subsection (a)(2)(A)(ii) or (b)(2)(B) of section 2604" of the Energy Policy Act
of 1992.184 The original Indian Tribal Energy Development and SelfDetermination Act provided for a similar type of entity, a tribal energy resource
development organization, 8 5 but TEDOs are allowed a higher degree of
autonomy in the energy development process under the proposed legislation.
Unlike in the current legislation, Senate Bill 2132 provides a process
through which organizations can formally apply to the Secretary for formal
TEDO certification.' 86 Under this bill, the Secretary must approve or
disapprove of an application for certification within 90 days of its
submission. 87 Similar to the bill's proposed protocol for determining capacity,
the bill requires that the Secretary approve of an application upon finding that
the tribe has, for at least three consecutive years prior to the submission of the
TERA, carried out a contract under titles I or IV of the Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act without "material audit
exceptions" and which contains "programs or activities relating to the
management of tribal land."' A few additional caveats to this approval
requirement, however, are that the requirement only applies when (a) the
TEDO is "organized under the laws of the Indian tribe and subject to the
jurisdiction and authority of the Indian tribe," (b) "the majority of the interest in
the [TEDO] is owned and controlled by the Indian Tribe (or the Indian tribe
and 1 or more other Indian tribes the tribal land of which is being developed),"
and (c) the "organizing document of the [TEDO] requires that the Indian tribe

183
184

Id
Id. § 105(a).

186

25 U.S.C. § 3501.
S. 2132 § 103(j)(6).

187

Id

188

Id

185
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(or the Indian tribe and. 1 or more other Indian tribes the tribal land of which is
being developed) own and control at all times a majority interest in the
[TEDO]."l 89

Once certified, a TEDO would be able to engage in certain central
aspects of the energy resource development process without the need for formal
Secretarial approval. Certified TEDOs would be able to enter into business
leases and agreements relating to energy resource development without
Secretarial approval so long as (a) the majority of the interest in the TEDO is
"owned and controlled by the Indian tribe (or the Indian tribe and 1 or more
other Indian tribes the tribal land of which is being developed)" throughout the
entire term of the agreement, and (b) the term of the agreement does not exceed
30 years, or "in the case of a lease for the production of oil resources, gas
resources, or both, 10 years and as long thereafter as oil or gas is produced in
paying quantities."l 90 Certified TEDOs would also be able to grant rights-ofway over tribal land for energy development facilities or to serve the purpose of
any "lease or business agreement entered into for energy resource development
on tribal land."' 9' Once again, the majority of the interest in the TEDO must be
owned by the Indian tribes throughout the term of the right-of-way, and the
term cannot, in any circumstances, exceed 30 years.1 92 Notwithstanding these
restrictions, however, this bill supplies a great deal of autonomy to certified
TEDOs in building a foundation for tribal energy resource development and
continuing to grow from that point.
On April 30, 2014, a legislative hearing was held before the Senate
Committee on Indian Affairs during which several tribal representatives
expressed enthusiastic support for the bill.' 93 The bases for this support varied
from speaker to speaker, though there was a common focus on the TERA
amendments. James M. Olguin, Acting Chairman for the Southern Ute Indian
Tribal Council, focused primarily on the amendments the new bill would make
to the TERA process.1 94 Olguin concisely summarized the failures of TERA to
date in stating "we are spending more time fighting with the Bureau of Indian
Affairs ('BIA') about nonsensical directives and conditions for obtaining

189

Id

190

Id
Id.

191
192

Id
Note that these testimonies are based off of a reading of the bill as it existed prior to the
amendments approved during the May 21st meeting of the Committee of Indian Affairs. The
amendments generally did not alter aspects of the bill for which these witnesses expressed
193

support.
194
Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act Amendments of 2014:
Hearing on S. 2132 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 113th Cong. 39-46 (2014)

[hereinafter Hearing on S. 2132] (statement of James M. Olguin, Acting Chairman, Southern Ute
Indian Tribal Council).
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federal approvals." 19 5 He also identified several reasons for TERA's failure,
non-exhaustively citing too much federal decision-making authority,
inadequate funding made available to TERAs in light of the fact that they
"would be assuming duties and responsibilities typically carried out by the
United States," unclear standards for measuring tribal capacity, and a
prohibitively cumbersome process for obtaining TERA approval. 196 Olguin
expressed support for specific TERA amendments in the new bill, including its
self-executing nature and its requirement of a positive finding of capacity based
on the successful execution of contracts under the Indian Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act.1 97
Michael 0. Finley, Chairman of the Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Reservation and First Vice-President of the National Congress of
American Indians, also supported the TERA amendments, identifying specific
provisions in the proposed bill that improve the TERA process. 198 Like Olguin,
Finley pointed to the self-executing nature of TERAs under the bill, stating that
"tribes cannot rely on the federal government to take action in a timely way." 9 9
Finley also pointed to the proposed funding mechanism for TERA-executing
tribes as a favorable amendment to the TERA process, acknowledging that
"[s]ome tribes have expressed concerns about the costs of implementing a
TERA and would want to have financial support for taking on the additional
activities." 2 00 Finley goes on to state that such a funding mechanism "would
provide funding to the tribe without impacting the Federal budget." 2 0 1
Tribal representatives also expressed a great deal of support for many
of the "add-ons" in the bill that would implement new projects or extend
certain rights to Indian tribes. Finley praised the weatherization program
mentioned above, stating the amendments that make up this new program are
"critical in that they would bring Indian tribes into closer parity with states in
being able to access these weatherization funds."2 02 Carole Lankford, who is
Vice Chairwoman of the Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the
Flathead Nation, expressed support for section 201 of the bill, which would
amend section 7(a) of the Federal Power Act to extend to Indian tribes federal
preference in issuing licenses for operation and construction of "dams,

195

196

Id. at 45.
Id. at 44.

Id. at 45.
Id. at 33-35 (statement of Michael 0. Finley, Chairman, Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Reservation; First Vice President, National Congress of American Indians).
199
Id. at 34.
200
Id.
197
198

201

Id.

202

Id. at 35.
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conduits, reservoirs, etc." 203 Lankford cited the importance of obtaining these
hydro-licenses in allowing her tribe to retain its self-governance by managing
its own trust land.204 She noted also that these licenses would give rise to much
needed employment opportunities within her tribe.205
Lankford and Finley both also spoke out in favor of section 202 of the
bill, which amends the Tribal Forest Protection Act of 2004 to require the
Secretary to enter into "stewardship agreements" with a certain number of
tribes to "carry out demonstration projects to promote biomass energy
projects . . on. Indian forest land and in nearby communities by providing
reliable supplies of woody biomass from Federal land." 2 06 While Finley
generally praised this program in both its promotion of biomass usage and the
opportunity it provides for tribes to "perform forest health projects and on
neighboring federal forest and rangelands," 207 Lankford focused specifically on
how the onset of unharvested biomass has damaged the health of her tribe's
forestlands, providing practical anecdotal evidence to encourage the
implementation of such a program. 20 8 Despite the opportunity presented in this
legislation, unless and until this bill attaches to a pressing political impetus,
tribes cannot securely rely on this bill as a catalyst for meaningful progress in
the tribal energy development framework.
The failure of the existing TERA to take hold and the uncertainty about
real trust remedies in the case law raise the possibility of the trust responsibility
as ripe for political negotiation. The Federal Indian Trust remains largely
unenforceable and vulnerable due to jurisprudential erosion, and the political
exchange by tribes of this right for more tribal sovereignty and resource control
begs consideration of the impact of the obligation of the federal government to
consider the overall public interest and resulting federal at-large policy that is at
times discordant and conflicted with interests specific to Indian communities in
broader management of land and natural resources.209
This problem is rooted in the fact that the United States will always be
a conflicted and imperfect trustee. Conversely, indigenous peoples, faced with

203
Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 797(e), 800(a) (2013); Indian Tribal Energy
Development and Self-Determination Act of 2005, S. 2132, 113th Cong. § 201 (2014); Hearing
on S. 2132, supra note 194, at 28-29 (statement of Carole Lankford, Vice Chairwoman,
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes).
204
Hearingon S. 2132, supra note 194, at 29.
205

Id
Id. at 29-30, 33, 35; S. 2132, § 202.
207
Hearingon S. 2132, supra note 194, at 33.
208
Id. at 29-30.
209
See Tsosie, supra note 80, at 290-96 (discussing this discordance specifically in the
context of religious interests, as seen in Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbit, 175 F.3d 814
(10th Cir. 1999), as well as the debate over members of the Hopi Tribe taking eagles at Wupatki
National Monument outside of Flagstaff); see also Kronk, supra note 158; Royster, supra note 9.
206
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considerations as to the lands to which they are inextricably tied, upon which
the very survival of their communities, both cultural and physical rests, are
compelled to act as their own best fiduciaries.210
VII. TRIBAL SOLUTIONS

While the courts and Congress continue to wrestle with how to
reconcile tribal sovereignty over mineral development with the federal Indian
trust doctrine, tribes have employed a form of self-help from the existing
regime with models that maximize resource development and effectively
balance tribal sovereignty and protective remedies for tribes whose lands are
used for mineral development. The Southern Ute Indian Tribe in southwestern
Colorado has found success in both areas through the Red Willow Production
Company ("Red Willow"). 2 11 While the working interest model embodied by
Red Willow may present the most tribally active and sustainable means of
economic development for energy resource development, it remains subject to
federal oversight and approval.2 12
While tribes find themselves at a disadvantage in the areas of both
energy resource development and participation in the capital market, Red
Willow, founded by the Southern Ute Indian Tribe in 1992 as an operator of
wells on tribal lands, has developed into an expansive enterprise operating
wells throughout Colorado, New Mexico, Texas, and Louisiana and having
well interests in undeveloped lands in several other states and the Gulf of
213
The genesis of this highly successful company can be traced back to
Mexico.
1974, when the Tribe placed a moratorium on new energy leases based on
shortcomings of the federal government to "negotiate appropriate compensation
for leases on the reservation." 2 14 The Tribe did not rely on the federal
government to serve as trustee, rather, it instead sought its own experts to
apprise the Tribe of the extent and true value of its undeveloped resources.2 15

See Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of Self-Determination: The
Role ofEthics, Economics, and TraditionalEcologicalKnowledge, 21 VT. L. REV. 225 (1996).
211
Welcome, Red WILLOW PRODUCTION COMPANY, http://www.rwpc.us/Default.aspx (last
210

visited Nov. 5, 2015).
212
213

See id.
See Areas of Operations, RED WILLOW PRODUCTION COMPANY, http://www.rwpc.us/

AreasOfOperations/Default.aspx (last visited Nov. 5, 2015); see also Regan & Anderson, supra
note 2, at 217 (giving a quantitative value to the capital success of Red Willow: "Today, the
tribe's 1,400 members are each worth millions on paper and receive dividends every year from
the fund.").
214
Unlocking the Wealth ofIndian Nations, supra note 2, at 17; see also Jonathan Thompson,
The Ute Paradox, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (July 19, 2010), http://www.hcn.org/issues/42.12/theute-paradox.
215
See sources cited supra note 214.
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The capital used to begin gas production on the reservation came in the
form of an $8 million settlement payment from the federal government in the
Colorado Ute Water Rights Settlement.216 The decision to deploy the water
settlement money to tribal mineral development was a high-risk move for the
Tribe's leaders, both politically and financially.21 7 Politically, it was certain to
upset the tribal membership, who were already receiving lower per capita
income because of the moratorium on energy leases and its impact on oil and
gas royalties.218 At the time, the Tribe was impoverished with a high
unemployment rate, and the risk to capital investment as it pertained to tribal
members on a per capita basis must have been a weighty matter indeed for the
tribal leaders.21
Although risky, the plan paid off for the Southern Utes. Red Willow is
now an expansive oil and gas operation with interests in wells covering a vast
geographical area and 140 full-time staff.2 20 Though perhaps an exceptional
example in terms of the sheer extent of its capital success, the success of Red
Willow can be viewed as a microcosm of the successes tribes have had in
managing their own resources; tribes taking affirmative steps to bring in their
own mineral experts in order to equip them with knowledge about their own
resources on their own lands is, unsurprisingly, maximally efficient.22 1
VIII. THE POSSIBILITY OF FPIC TO REALIZE TRIBAL ENERGY SELFDETERMINATION

As history has shown, especially in the context of mineral
development, American Indians and the federal government both must grapple
with what has been legislatively and judicially perceived as an inverse

216
217

Thompson, supra note 214.
Id.

218

Id.

219

See id.
Who We Are, RED WILLOW PRODUCTION COMPANY, http://www.rwpc.us/WhoWeAre/

220

Default.aspx (last visited Nov. 5, 2015) ("The staff includes engineers, geologists, landmen,
accountants, gas control and marketing specialists, field foreman and lease operators, and
administrative staff."); see also About Us, SOUTHERN UTE INDIAN TRIBE GROWTH FUND,

http://www.sugf.com/ AboutUs.aspx (last visited Nov. 5, 2015) (stating that Red Willow is a
subsidiary of the Southern Ute Tribe Growth Fund, which was created as part of a Financial Plan
that "insures that a core government and matching finances will exist in perpetuity").
221
Unlocking the Wealth of Indian Nations, supra note 2, at 3 ("Policy reforms that enable
tribes to control their own resources will give tribes the opportunity to unlock the tremendous
wealth of Indian nations."); see also 2015 GAO REPORT, supra note 1; Thompson, supra note
214; cf Raymond Cross, Development's Victim or Its Beneficiary?: The Impact of Oil and Gas
Development on the Fort BertholdIndianReservation, 87 N.D. L. REv. 535 (2011).
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relationship between trust and sovereignty.22 2 Looking beyond a domestic
scope and into the international sphere, the international human rights
framework supports coexistence of trust and sovereignty, but does so in terms
that still fail to reconcile the two concepts on a systemic level. However, the
international human rights framework allows for a better application of rights
themselves as fundamental and internationally accepted standards for how
governing states should carry out their responsibilities over indigenous
communities.223
On December 16, 2010, President Barack Obama announced that the
United States is in support of United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous People ("UNDRIP"). 22 4 This non-binding 2007 U.N. Declaration
focuses largely on expressing rights held by indigenous communities to
exercise their "right to development in accordance with their own needs and
interests" in light of the fact that a long history of dispossession of indigenous
lands and resources has stood as an impediment to exercising these rights. 22 5
As to natural resource development on indigenous lands, article 32 of
UNDRIP states, "Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop
priorities and strategies for the development or use of their lands or territories
and other resources."22 6 There is no mention in this article about ascertaining
the best interest of the tribe, distinguishing it from IMLA and IMDA.22 7 It does,
however, confer upon governing states the responsibility to "provide effective
mechanisms for just and fair redress" to the tribe when the governing state

222

See Gover, supra note 68, at 357 (articulating the problem of the trust-plenary paradigm
and suggesting that "the time has come for the Tribes to move even further forward in the
exercise of their proprietary powers, and to further remove the United States from the day-to-day
management of their lands. The Tribes' assertions of authority and responsibility gain strength
and credibility when they take responsibility for the administration of trust resources.").
223
Kristen Carpenter & Angela R. Riley, Indigenous Peoples and the Jurisgenerative

Moment in Human Rights, 102 CALIF. L. REv. 173, 207-13 (2014) (describing several examples
of international human rights standards contributing to the development of a jurisprudential
paradigm favorable to Indigenous rights, even in the domestic sphere); see also S. James Anaya,
InternationalHuman Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The Move Toward the Multicultural State,
21 ARIZ. J. INT'L. & CoMP. L. 13,14 (2004) ("Numerous processes within the international system
have focused on the common set of ongoing problems that are central to the demands of
indigenous groups, such that there are discernible patterns of response and normative

understandings associated with the rubric of indigenous peoples. These international processes
now reveal a contemporary body of international human rights law on the subject." (citations
omitted)).
224

US: Obama Announces US Support to the UNDRIP, INT'L WORK GROUP FOR INDIGENOUS

AFF. (Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.iwgia.org/news/search-news?newsid=79.
225
G.A. Res. 61/295, annex, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13,
2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP].
226

Id. at art. 32.

227

Id.; see also 25 U.S.C. §§ 396, 2103(b) (2013).
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itself approves of projects that would affect indigenous lands or natural
resources. 22 8
In establishing a working interest in their energy development
resources, tribes should be able to find protection through the principles of free,
prior, and informed consent ("FPIC") as set out in UNDRIP. FPIC is an
emerging international standard for indigenous peoples. Closely tied to the
concepts of tribal sovereignty and self-determination, FPIC requires any entity
engaged with a tribe in a manner that impacts tribal resources to first receive
the tribe's free, prior, and informed consent. 22 9 FPIC is designed to replace the
historical processes that excluded tribes from decision-making regarding
activities that took place on or near their land. 230 FPIC has generally been
invoked in the context of resource extraction, but is also applicable to other
situations.
Free, prior, and informed consent appears at multiple points in the
Declaration. Perhaps most notable are articles 19 and 32. Article 19 of
UNDRIP requires states to "consult and cooperate in good faith with the
indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in
order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent before adopting and
implementing legislative or administrative measures that may affect them." 2 3 1
Article 32 requires that states obtain "free and informed consent prior to the
approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources,
particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of
mineral, water or other resource."232
Using UNDRIP to sway the United States' domestic disposition
surrounding Indian mineral development would require a new statutory regime
to guard against domestic self-interest and seek tribal self-determination via
consent. 2 33 UNDRIP is a non-binding document. Even with President Obama's

228

UNDRIP, supra note 225, art. 32.

229
Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
James Anaya: Extractive Industries and Indigenous Peoples, ¶¶ 26-29, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/24/41
(July 1, 2014), http://unsr.jamesanaya.org/docs/annual/2013-hrc-annual-report-en.pdf.
230

UN-REDD PROGRAMME, GUIDELINES ON FREE, PRIOR AND INFORMED CONSENT
18 (2013),

[hereinafter
www.un-redd.org/Launch_of FPICGuidelines/tabid/105976/Default.aspx
UNREDD] (follow "UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent
(FPIC)").
231
UNDRIP, supra note 225, art. 19.
232
Id. at art. 32.
233
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Consent, 8 STAN. J. Civ. RTS. & C.L. 45 (2012) (exploring
consent theory as applied to Federal Indian Law); cf Exec. Order 13175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249
(Nov. 6, 2000) ("Each agency shall have an accountable process to ensure meaningful and timely
input by tribal officials in the development of regulatory policies that have tribal implications.
Within 30 days after the effective date of this order, the head of each agency shall designate an
official with principal responsibility for the agency's implementation of this order. Within 60
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endorsement, the declaration has no influence from a purely legal standpoint.
However, tribes can still utilize UNDRIP as political capital to protect their
rights. If tribes make this demand the prevalent norm, then Congress may begin
to consider its plenary authority in accordance with UNDRIP, altering the
entire legal and administrative landscape in a manner conducive to sufficient
protection of tribal property rights.
International Labour Organization ("ILO") Convention No. 169, or the
Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries, is another key international human rights instrument affecting these
issues and weighs heavily in promotion of self-determination and cultural
protection of indigenous communities. 234 Former United Nations Special
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, S. James Anaya, describes this
Convention as "perhaps the most prominent and specific international
affirmation of indigenous cultural integrity and group identity."235 Article 7 of
the Convention encompasses this idea of cultural integrity from a selfdetermination angle.236 This article states that indigenous tribal people "shall
have the right to decide their own priorities for the process of development as it
affects their lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritual well-being. . . and to
exercise control, to the extent possible, over their own economic, social and
cultural development." 237 This language suggests an international policy that
favors giving indigenous communities control over not just the mechanisms for
protecting the economic and spiritual well-being of tribes, but also over the
process of prioritizing the tribe's needs in deciding what development
initiatives to take and when to take them.238
Using both Convention No. 169 and UNDRIP as exemplars, Anaya
summarizes the status of indigenous people in the general international human
rights framework. 2 39 Anaya states "the contemporary human rights regime
concerning indigenous peoples advances, on the one hand, cultural integrity
and autonomy and, on the other, participatory engagement." 2 40 He then notes
that this "dual thrust," reflects an international view that indigenous
communities are both a part of and distinct from the governing states under

days of the effective date of this order, the designated official shall submit to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) a description of the agency's consultation process.").
234
International Labour Organisation, Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, 1650 U.N.T.S. 383 (entered into force
Sept. 5, 1991) [hereinafter Convention No. 169].
235
See Anaya, supra note 223, at 23.
236
Convention No. 169, supra note 234, art. 7.
237
Id
238
Id.; see also Anaya, supra note 223, at 22-23 (stating that Convention No. 169 "generally
enjoins states to respect indigenous peoples' aspirations in all decisions affecting them").
239
Anaya, supra note 223, at 60.
240

Id.
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which they fall. 24 ' From an American perspective, this international view could
easily be understood as a manifestation of the "domestic dependent nation"
status that has proven complicating to the idea of tribal sovereignty in
American jurisprudence.24 2
However, Anaya speaks positively about the UNDRIP as an
embodiment of international "principles of self-determination and cultural
integrity" that collectively "uphold the right of indigenous peoples to maintain
and develop their own customary law systems of self-governance."24 3 He points
specifically to article 33 of the draft of UNDRIP, which states that
"[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to promote, develop and maintain their
institutional structures and their distinctive juridical customs, traditions,
procedures and practices, in accordance with internationally recognised human
rights standards." 24 According to Anaya, included in these "internationally
recognised human rights" are rights that comport with indigenous conceptions
of ownership that have proven to be problematic sources of dissonance between
western culture and native communities throughout the course of history.24 5
Anaya looks specifically to Convention No. 169 providing for recognition of
indigenous land tenure systems in asserting that this Convention "affirms the

241

Id

242
Krakoff, supra note 79, at 1110--13 ("'Scholars need to educate the federal courts-as well
as ourselves-that tribal self-government can prosper in the twenty-first century in ways that are
efficacious and appropriate.' Otherwise, the impression will continue in the minds of some
members of the Court and many members of the public that tribal sovereignty is nothing more
than an inconsistent, paradoxical legal shell that American case law has constructed." (quoting
Philip P. Frickey, Doctrine, Context, InstitutionalRelationships, and Commentary: The Malaise
ofFederalIndian Law Through the Lens ofLone Wolf 38 TULSA L. REv. 5, 12 n.37 (2002))).
243
Anaya, supra note 223, at 49-52; see also International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights art. 1(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). Anaya cites to the latter two documents to exemplify his
statement that a "common article 1 of the international human rights covenants" state something
along the lines of the following: "All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and
cultural development." UNDRIP, supra note 225, art. 34.
244
Anaya, supra note 223, at 51 (citing Comm'n on Hum. Rts., Rep. of the Sub-Comm'n on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on Its Forty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1995/2, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56, at 113 (Oct. 28, 1994)). Anaya's article was published in
2004 when the UNDRIP was still a proposed draft. Article 34 of the resulting Declaration states
essentially the same as this the draft: "Indigenous peoples have the right to promote, develop and
maintain their institutional structures and their distinctive customs, spirituality, traditions,
procedures, practices and, in the cases where they exist, juridical systems or customs, in
accordance with international human rights standards." UNDRIP, supranote 225, art. 34.

245
Anaya, supra note 223, at 40-41. See generally Carpenter & Riley, supra note 223
(proposing a model of ownership that shifts away from individual-based property law rights and
into a stewardship model that more aptly protects tribal interests in obtaining and enforcing
property rights as a means of protecting cultural heritage).
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notion, promoted by various international institutions, that indigenous peoples,
as groups, are entitled to a continuing relationship with lands and natural
2 46
resources according to traditional patterns of use or occupancy."
FPIC is an international rights-based standard for interactions with
indigenous peoples. Closely tied to the concepts of tribal sovereignty and selfdetermination, FPIC requires any entity engaged with a tribe in a manner that
impacts tribal resources to first receive the tribe's free, prior and informed
consent.24 7 FPIC is designed to replace the historical processes that excluded
tribes from decision-making regarding activities that took place on or near their
land.248 FPIC has generally been applied in the context of resource extraction,
but may be appropriate in other settings.249
Each element of free, prior, and informed consent has legal
significance. It is important to note that these definitions are still being
developed and are often context-specific. First, consent can only be made freely
if "given voluntarily and absent of 'coercion, intimidation or manipulation,"'
and the process "is self-directed by the community from whom consent is
sought, unencumbered by coercion, expectations or timelines that are externally
imposed." 25 0 it is clear that a tribe must be given time to "understand, access,
and analyze information" before giving consent. 2 5 1 However, there is
disagreement about the stage in the planning and development process at which
consent must be obtained.252
Critically, consent can only be properly obtained if a tribe is adequately
informed of all of the potential harms and impacts of a proposed activity. 253
This means that the tribe should have access to information that is "clear,
consistent, accurate, constant, [] transparent ... objective ... and complete."254
This includes access to information in the local language and in a format that is
culturally appropriate. 25 5 The precise set of actions that constitutes consent

Anaya, supra note 223, at 40 (citing Convention No. 169, supra note 234, arts. 14(1), (3)).
Article 14(1) states that "[t]he rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over
the lands which they traditionally occupy shall be recognised." Id. Anaya points out the
significance of the present tense in the word "occupy" but also notes that the Convention, via
article 13, allows for a constructive present "occupancy" to be established by showing a cultural
246

connection to the land. Id.
247
Hum. Rts. Council, supra note 229.
248
UN-REDD, supra note 230, at 18.
249

Hum. Rts. Council, supra note 229.

250

UN-REDD, supra note 230, at 16, 18.

251

Id. at 19.
See, e.g., id at 20.

252
253

Id. at 19.

254

Id.
Id.

255
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varies from indigenous group to group.256 FPIC is a relatively new concept that
has most often been considered in an international, rather than a domestic,
context. It is clear, however, that consent is predicated on the ability for a tribe
to say "[n]o" to a proposed activity.
One essential question is whose consent must be obtained. Many feel
that all impacted rightsholders and community members must be included in
the process in order for there to be free, prior, and informed consent. 258 Another
critical question is whether consent should be given once or should be required
at each phase of an agreement's implementation. 259
In the public context, FPIC is seen as a minimum standard for nations

working with indigenous groups. 26 0 FPIC is recognized in multiple articles of
UNDRIP.26 1 Article 32, for instance, states the following:
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with
the indigenous peoples concerned through their own
representative institutions in order to obtain their free and
informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting
their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in
connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of
mineral, water or other resources.262
Although the document is not legally binding, this helps demonstrate the
nation's acceptance of the concept of FPIC.
In the private context, FPIC is developing into an international standard
for companies operating on indigenous lands.2 Much of this progress is a
result of shareholders concerned about the financial and reputational risks to
which their companies are exposed when o erating on indigenous land without
the consent of the impacted community. 2 4 For instance, in 2007, 91.6% of
shareholders passed a resolution that directed the Newmont Mining
Corporation to assess their practices and policies with respect to indigenous
peoples. 26 5 Newmont, as a founding member of the International Council on

256

Id. at 20.

257

Id
Id
See, e.g., id.
-

258

259
260

FIRST PEOPLES WORLDWIDE,

INDIGENOUS

PEOPLES GUIDEBOOK ON FREE PRIOR AND

INFORMED CONSENT AND CORPORATION STANDARDS 4 (2011), http://www.firstpeoples.org/

images/uploads/IPs%20Guidebook%20to%20FPIC.pdf.
261
UNDRIP, supra note 225, arts. 10, 11, 19, 28, 29, 32.
262
Id. art. 32.
263

FIRST PEOPLES WORLDWIDE, supra note 260.

264

Id

265

Id at 3.
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Mining and Metals ("ICMM"), recently approved an Indigenous Peoples and
Mining Statement that recognizes FPIC and discusses the importance of
engaging and consulting with indigenous communities that may be impacted by
their business operations. 2 66 ICMM states that indigenous people should be "(i)
able to freely make decisions without coercion, intimidation or manipulation;
(ii) given sufficient time to be involved in project decision making before key
decisions are made and impacts occur; and (iii) fully informed about the project
and its potential impacts and benefits."2 6 7
In Indigenous Peoples' Right to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent:
Reflections on Concepts and Practice, Joji Cariflo suggests that free, prior and
informed consent is a key aspect in adhering to a "rights-and-risks" approach to
decision-making regarding energy resource development.26 8 The "rights-andrisks" approach "explicitly combines human rights impact assessments with
risks assessments" in ascertaining the stakeholders for these decisions.2 69
Cariflo presents this approach as being part of a greater scheme of proper
negotiation with stakeholders, a scheme that is at odds with the "balance-sheet"
approach, in which the benefits that a decision can provide for one group are
"statistically offset against adverse impacts on other sections of society." 2 70
Through free, prior, and informed consent principles within a "rights-and-risks"
scheme for decision-making, tribes should be able to establish a working
interest in their energy resources without undue interference from outside
entities that seek benefits perceived to outweigh those of the tribe.
This developing legal canon of free, prior, and informed consent can
play a role in broadening the scope of tribal jurisdiction. Stemming from
UNDRIP's FPIC requirements, Matthew L.M. Fletcher's take on consent
theory is one potential protection mechanism for tribes having a working
interest in energy resource development. In Tribal Consent, Fletcher defines
consent theory as the "notion that tribal authority remains extant absent

266

Strengthening Our Commitment to the Rights ofIndigenous Peoples, NEWMONT (May 22,
2013), www.newmont.com/our-voice-blog/2013/Strengthening-Our-Commitment-to-the-Rights-

of-Indigenous-Peoples/default.aspx?view-details&item=Strengthening-Our-Commitment-to-theRights-of-Indigenous-Peoples.
267

INT'L COUNCIL ON MINING &

METALS, INDIGENOUS

PEOPLES AND

MINING (2013),

http://www.icmm.com/document/5433.
268
Joji Cariflo, Indigenous Peoples' Right to Free, Prior, Informed Consent: Reflections on
Concepts andPractice, 22 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 19, 21-24 (2005); see also WORLD COMM'N
ON DAMS, DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION MAKING (2001),

www.intemationalrivers.org/files/attached-files/worldcommission-on-damsfinal
269
Cariflo, supra note 268, at 22-23.

report.pdf.

270

Id. at 22; see also WORLD COMM'N ON DAMS, supra note 268, at 204 ("We are moving
from assessing public interest in general terms to a focus on improving equity in the spread of
costs and benefits from development .... The emerging consensus on the need for greater

transparency and participation in development decision-making is likely to speed up this
transition considerably.").
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consensual abrogation of that authority." 2 7 1 Fletcher's article focuses on the
role of consent as it pertains to tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers.2 72 Fletcher
argues that while the judiciary has not made comprehensive determinations on
whether there should be a legal presumption that tribes have jurisdiction over
nonmembers on tribal lands, tribes can take advantage of the fact that courts
cannot and will not hear every case challenging a tribal regulation over a
nonmember by exercising tribal jurisdiction through what Joseph Kalt and
Stephen Cornell refer to as "de facto sovereignty."2 73 Through this exercise,
tribes can move toward establishing their own "consent regime[s]" shaping the
requirement under Montana that nonmembers must be engaged in a consensual
relationship with the tribe in order fall under tribal jurisdiction.274 This type of
tribal juridical indoctrination can help fortify tribal jurisdiction over
nonmembers, helping establish a foundational legal landscape supporting the
implementation of consent theory.
Although the United States and major extractive companies are moving
toward a respect for tribal rights, it will be the tribes themselves that are vested
with the unique opportunity to proactively engage stakeholders with respect to
FPIC as a condition for companies engaging with the tribe. A consent regime
recognizes this right and this reality, and considers both best interests and
fulfills self-determination.
IX. KEYSTONE XL AS AN EXAMPLE OF PLENARY POWER WITHOUT FPIC

One issue that in many ways embodies the current political juncture of
energy resource development and how it relates to Indian tribes is that of the
Keystone XL Pipeline. The Keystone XL Pipeline is a proposed project of
TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, LP, ("Keystone") which entails the
construction of an 875-mile oil pipeline from Morgan, Montana to Steele City,
Nebraska, enabling over 800,000 barrels of crude oil to be directly transported
from the Western Canadian Sedimentary Basin to middle America each day. 2 75
While this pipeline has undoubtedly been at the forefront of political
discourse over environmental policy since it was initially proposed, it has

Fletcher, supra note 233, at 118.
See id. at 109-20.
273
Id. at 118-19 ("This shift toward self-determination has allowed those nations that have
been willing to do so to engage in genuine self-governance, to turn sovereignty as a legal matter
into de facto sovereignty: sovereignty in fact and practice." (citing Cornell & Kalt, supra note
152, at 188)).
274
Fletcher, supra note 233, at 119.
271

272

275

U.S.

DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF OCEANS & INT'L ENvTL. & Sa. AFFAIRS, FINAL

SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT OF THE KEYSTONE XL PROJECT: EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY 1 (2014) [hereinafter EIS EXEC. SUMMARY], http://keystonepipeline-xl.state.gov/
documents/organization/221135.pdf.
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picked up considerable steam with the incoming of the 114th Congress. Within
the first two weeks of January 2015, the Senate and the House of
Representatives both introduced identical bills to approve the pipeline, both of
which have since reached the Senate Calendar. 2 76 The bills, both entitled
"Keystone XL Pipeline Act," would give express congressional authorization to
"construct, connect, operate, and maintain the pipeline and cross-border
facilities." 277
The pipeline itself is certainly no windfall for Indian tribes. According
to the Executive Summary of the State Department Bureau of Oceans and
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs's Final Supplemental Impact
Statement for the Keystone XL Project ("Final Supplemental EIS"),
approximately 17% of the land near the proposed pipeline "intersects areas
with low income or minority populations, including Indian tribes." 2 7 8 The Final
Supplemental EIS also concludes that the Cheyenne River Indian Reservation
and the Rosebud Indian Reservation are amongst the minority population areas
affected by the proposed project. 27 9 The Final Supplemental EIS then identifies
some of the possible adverse effects on this project for these areas as "exposure
to construction dust and noise, disruption to traffic patterns, and increased
competition for medical or health service."2 80
These dangers to tribal well-being are compounded by the threat the
pipeline poses to Indian sacred sites. In 2011, the Great Plains Tribal
Chairman's Association ("GPTCA") issued a letter to President Obama urging
him to refrain from approving the construction of the pipeline. 2 8 1 Amongst a
bevy of other objections to the pipeline, the GPTCA stated in its letter that the
pipeline could destroy or compromise thousands of sacred cultural
resources held by the Great Sioux Nation in violation of the Fort Laramie
Treaties of 1851 and 1868.282 Similarly, in April 2013, the National Congress
of American Indians ("NCAI") produced comments in response to the draft
Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement that had been released by the
Department of State in March of the same year. 2 83 In these comments, the

Keystone XL Pipeline Act, S. 1, 114th Cong. (2015); Keystone XL Pipeline Act,
H.R. 3,
114th Cong. (2015).
277
S. 1; H.R. 3.
276

278

EIS ExEc. SUMMARY, supra note 275, at 20.

279

Id. at 21.

280

Id
Letter from John Steele, Chairman, Great Plains Tribal Chairman's Ass'n, to Barack
Obama, President (Jan. 11, 2015), http://indigenousrising.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/GPT
CAletter-to-obama.pdf.
282
Id
281

283

NAT'L CONG. OF AM.

INDIANS,

COMMENTS

IN RESPONSE TO THE UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF STATE DRAFT SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
FOR THE
KEYSTONE XL PROJECT APPLICANT FOR PRESIDENTIAL PERMIT
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NCAI explained that while the pipeline would not cross through reservation
lands themselves, they would still pass through lands that tribes have
historically considered sacred.284 The NCAI pointed specifically to lands that
are "the territory of tribal nations as recognized in the Treaty of Fort Laramie of
1851," lands which "hold religious and cultural significance for the tribal
nations involved in that treaty." 2 1
Concern over sacred sites has been addressed to some extent. As Final
Supplemental EIS explains, the Programmatic Agreement signed by Keystone,
several state and -federal agencies, and Indian tribes requires that Keystone
"complete cultural resources surveys on all areas that would be potentially
impacted by the proposed Project" and "provide adequate mitigation in
consultation with the Department, state and federal agencies, and Indian
tribes."2 86 While this alleviates some of the concern over the damaging effects
the pipeline may have on sacred sites, there does not appear to be any reference
to FPIC in this consultation requirement, calling into question what it would
truly mean for Keystone to minimally comply with the Agreement. Moreover,
the Final Supplemental EIS explains that the Indian tribes would have a role in
determining the mitigation measures Keystone must take in cases where
"cultural resources will be affected." 2 87 This language is vague in describing
what such a situation might look like. For instance, can this "inability" to avoid
a cultural resource stem from a balancing of interests? If so, then the benefits of
consultation become highly compromised.
Unfortunately for Indian tribes that will be affected by the construction
of the Keystone XL pipeline, these risks are grounded in a very serious reality.
In November of 2014, Rosebud Sioux President, Cyril Scott, stated to RT that
congressional approval of the pipeline would constitute an "act of war," later
explaining that the construction of the pipeline would threaten the health of
future generations by contaminating the Ogallala Aquifer, which he identified
as the "second biggest water aquifer in the world." 2 8 Scott lamented the "lack

http://www.ncai.org/resources/testimony/ncai-comments-on-the-draft-supplementalenvironmental-impact-statement-dseis-for-the-proposed-keystone-xl-pipeline.
284
Id. at 13.
285

Id.

286

EIS EXEC. SUMMARY, supra note 275, at 26.

287

Id

PassingKeystone Pipeline 'An Act of War,'Sioux Tribe President Tells RT, RT (Nov. 20,
2014), https://www.rt.com/usa/207107-sioux-keystone-act-war/; see also Amanda Holpuch,
South Dakota Sioux Tribe Calls Keystone XL Pipeline Approval 'Act of War,' THEGUARDIAN
(Nov. 17, 2014, 1:49 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/nov/17/sioux-tribekeystone-xl-pipeline-south-dakota-act-of-war; As Sioux Tribe Calls Keystone XL an "Act of
War", Transcanada Hires PR Firn to Probe Critics, DEMOCRACY Now! (Nov. 19, 2014),
http://www.democracynow.org/2014/l 1/19/assioux-tribe-calls keystone-xl.
288
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of intergovernmental cooperation" on this issue,2 89 a statement which is very
much vindicated by the 2014 Indigenous Rights Risk Report published by First
Peoples Worldwide. According to this report, U.S.-based extractive companies
have done a very poor job implementing policies that address relationships with
tribes. Among the 330 projects assessed in the report, 89% presented high to
medium levels of risk exposure to tribal opposition or violations of tribal rights,
yet only 38% of the projects had policies that even "reference[d] Indigenous
Peoples" while only a total of five companies had policies that referenced

FPIC. 29 0 This suggests that even the few companies that have implemented
Indigenous Peoples policies have not done so in a manner that ensures
meaningful consultation with Indigenous tribes prior to engaging in potentially
harmful projects. With this rather galvanizing track record among extractive
companies, First Peoples Worldwide points out that "TransCanada has two
options: either expect profit loss due to community opposition, or adjust their
community engagement policies." 29 1
It is not difficult to see that the hazards addressed in the report cover a
wide gamut of afflictions, obstacles, and interruptions to a well-functioning
tribal government, yet, much like private extractive companies, Congress has
done very little to address these tribal concerns in moving forward with the
approval process for this pipeline. The bills themselves make no express
mention of Indians. The only area where the language may be construed as
invocative of Indian rights is in its declaration that the Final Supplemental
Impact Statement issued by the Secretary of State shall satisfy "an ...
provision of law that requires Federal agency consultation or review."
If
anything, however, this statement dismisses Indian rights as being previously
addressed and satisfied instead of providing them with any viable grounds for
protection to rely upon.
It may be true that the threats to tribes that are presented by the pipeline
have been ignored by Congress at large, but they have not gone unnoticed by
all members of Congress. In 2013, Congress introduced the Northern Route
Approval Act, a bill which, if enacted, would eliminate the need for a
presidential permit for the pipeline.293 On April 16, 2013, Ben Ray Lujin, a

Zod Schlanger, South Dakota Sioux Says Keystone XL Approval Is an 'Act of War,' Will
Close Its Borders, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 18, 2014, 12:53 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/southdakota-sioux-says-keystone-xl-approval-act-war-will-close-its-borders-285276.
290
FIRST PEOPLES WORLDWIDE, INDIGENOUs RIGHTS RISK REPORT 32, 36 (2014), http://first
peoples.org/images/uploads/Indigenous%20Rights%20Risk%20Report.pdf.
289

291

At a Loss: The Unmentioned Social Risks of Keystone XL Approval, FIRST PEOPLES

http://firstpeoples.org/wp/at-a-loss-the-unmentioned-social-risks-of-keystone-xlWORLDWIDE,
approval/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2015).
292
Keystone XL Pipeline Act, S. 1, 114th Cong. § 2(b)(2) (2015); Keystone XL Pipeline Act,
H.R. 3, 114th Cong. § 2(b)(2) (2015).
293
Northern Route Approval Act, H.R. 3, 113th Cong. (2013).
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Representative from New Mexico, proposed an amendment to the bill which
would add an entire section at the end of the bill stating the following:
This Act shall not become effective unless the President
determines that Native American tribes, in States where the
pipeline will be located, will be fully consulted and that
cultural and paleological sites significant to such tribes will be
protected to the fullest extent possible during construction and
operation of the Keystone XL pipeline.29 4
This amendment did not survive long. During an Energy and
Commerce Committee Full Committee Mark Up on the bill on April 17, 2013,
the Lujan amendment was defeated by a roll-call vote. 295 The Committee went
on to favorably report the bill itself.29 6

On January 27, 2015, Senator Ben Cardin of Maryland offered the
following amendment, directly addressing the concerns expressed by both the
GPTCA and the NCAI:
Nothing in this Act may change, suspend, supersede, or
abrogate any trust obligation or treaty requirement of the
United States with respect to any Indian nation, Indian tribe,
individual Indian, or Indian tribal organization, including the
Fort Laramie Treaties of 1851 and 1868, without consultation
with, and the informed and express consent of, the applicable
Indian nation, Indian tribe, individual Indian, or Indian tribal
organization as required under Executive Order 13175 (67 Fed.
Reg. 67249) (November 6, 2000).297
Yet, on January 29, 2015, the Senate voted to approve the pipeline via
the Keystone Pipeline Approval Act, a bill which included neither Senator
Cardin's amendments nor any mention whatsoever of Indian treaties or sacred
sites.2 98 This omission once again proved that tribes will likely remain
marginalized as long as energy resource development in the United States is
shaped and steered by political forces.299

Amendment to H.R. 3, 113th Cong. § 9 (as proposed by Mr. Ben Ray Lujdn of New
Mexico, Apr. 16, 2013), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IFO0/20130417/100723/BILLS-113HR3-L000570-Amdt-09.pdf.
294

295

COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, 113TH CONGRESS ROLL CALL VOTE OF H.R.
3, THE

(Apr. 17, 2013), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF00/
20130417/100723/CRPT-113-IFOO-VoteO0-20130417.pdf.
296
See id.
297
161 CONG. REc. S529 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2015) (statement of Sen. Ben Cardin).
298
Keystone XL Pipeline Approval Act, S. 1, 114th Cong. (2015).
299
Cf Tsilhqot'in Nation v. British Columbia, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 256 (Can.) (holding that
"[o]nce Aboriginal title is established, S. 35 of the ConstitutionAct, 1982 permits incursions on it
"NORTHERN ROUTE APPROVAL ACT"
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CONCLUSION

The continuum spanning federal trust, congressional expression of
plenary authority, and tribal sovereignty has resulted in an outdated set of
politically-driven solutions that fails to recognize fundamental tribal
sovereignty or human rights as currently understood. The fiduciary obligation
of the United States as trustee mandates that the right to consent confirmed in
UNDRIP and the federal government's policy of self-determination condition
Congress's exercise of plenary authority, freeing the process from political
considerations, outmoded paternalistic norms, and the reality of trust failure. A
rights-based consent regime is a forward-looking mechanism that has the
potential to truly empower the tribes to more fully realize self-rule over their
resources and lands.

only with the consent of the Aboriginal group or if they are justified by a compelling and
substantial public purpose and are not inconsistent with the Crown's fiduciary duty to the
Aboriginal group" and finding that permits by the Canadian government to permit logging failed
to meet this standard).
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